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ABSTRACT
The need and scope for macroeconomic policy coordination during the various
stages towards economic and monetary union in Europe are discussed. Attention
is focused on both monetary and budgetary policies as well as on stabilisation
end public-finance aspects. A case ia made for sn independent European Central
Bank, even though this may induce a sub-optimal government revenue mix, end
for e budget-neutral European Federal Transfer Scheme, especially when labour
mobility remains low and shocks are country-specific. Apart from the usual
advantages of a common currency area, fixed exchange rates avoid beggar-thy-
neighbour attempts to export inflation. The main disadvantage is that it is
more difficult to conduct stabilisation policy in the presence of country-
specific shocks. Economic and monetary union poses at least five threats to
the size of the public sector in Europe: (i) less seigniorage revenues means
less public funds; (ii) integration means that government spending is more and
more like a public good, whose supply will be inadequate; (iii) international
competítion drives tax rates down and leaves less room for the public sector;
(iv) when there is a desire to boost the real value of Europe's real exchange
rate and thus the real income of Europe's citizens, individual treasuries
pursue a too tight fiscal policy; (v) as markets become more integrated, a
budgetary expansion is likely to be a locomotive policy so that in the face of
adverse supply shocks the fiscal stance is likely to be too tight. Although
one can think of a number of reasons why European coordination of
macroeconomic policies may be counterproductive, they do not seem persuasive
enough. Hence, if one wants to avoid a flourishing of the private sector at
the expense of a decline of the public sector, one should make sure to
coordinate the budgetary policies of the treasuries of Europe.
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The objective of this report is to discuss the need and scope for
macroeconomic policy coordination in Europe during the various stagea towards
economic and monetary union. Part I discusses the proposals of the Delors
Committee and discusses also some alternative stages and routes towards
European integratio~,. Attention is paid to the concepts of convergence,
coordination and harmonisation of macroeconomic policies as well as to rulea
and discretionary outcomes. Part II is concerned with the need for
coordination of macroeconomic stabilisetion policies under alternative
exchange-rate regimes, when Europe ia hit by ahocks that cause atagflation.
Careful distinction is made between European-wide and country-specífic shocks
and attention is paid to both monetary and budgetary policies. The advantage
of a monetary union is that beggar-thy-neighbour attempts to appreciate the
currency are avoided, but the disadvantage is that stabilisation policy is
more difficult to conduct in the face of country-specific shocks. This is why
there may be a case for a European Federal Transfer Scheme (EFTS). Part III is
concerned with the public-finance aspects of macroeconomic policy under the
European Monetary System (EMS) and with the coordination of macroeconomic
policies in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Because competition among
treasuries and central banks leads to too much seigniorage and too little tax
revenues, inflation is too high. An independent European Central Bank (ECB)
leads to too low inflation, but the advantages of the increase in monetary
discipline are likely to outweigh the disadvantages of a sub-optimal
government revenue mix. Unbridled competition between the treasuries of the
EMU leads to an under-supply of public goods and a downward trend in tax
retes. Since Europe's real exchange rate and current account may be
manipulated to boost the real income of Europe's citizena, it is likely that
budgetary stances will be too tight. Part IV provides three exemples of why
coordination of macroeconomic policies may be counterproductive: it destroys
the discipline of the monetary authorities, it may provoke an adverse response
from the rest of the world, and it may fail because countries disagree on how
the global economy works.
The conclusions make a case for an independent European System of Central
Banks (ESCB), for a budget-neutral European Federal Transfer Scheme (EFTS),
and for coordination of the budgetary policies of the individual treasuries.
The conclusions also argue that the EMU poses a serious threat to the size of
the public sector in Europe unless the budgetary policies of the variousz
treasuries are coordinated.
I. General issues of macroeconomic polícy on the road to economic and
monetary integration
1. The proposals of the Delors Committee for the EMU
The report prepared by the Delors Committee propuses three transition
stages on the road towards full economic and monetary union for Europe. The
first stage involves a closer convergence and coordination of the monetary
policies of the various countries taking part in the EMS1, all European
currencies to join the EMS, liberalisation of capital markets throughout
Europe, e wider use of the ECU, completion of the internal markets for goods
and services by removing physical, technical and structural obstacles to free
intra-European trade, a common competition policy and other means to
strengthen the market mechanism, and a doubling of regional and structural
funds. Much progress has already been made on the first stage. The first stage
of the Delors proposals for economic and monetary union in Europe has, in
principle, been accepted by the Council of Ministers on 26-2~ June 1989 in
Madrid. Eight countries of the European Community must have fully liberalised
capital movements by lst July 199o and the other countries will follow suit.
Spain has recently joined the EMS end the UK has agreed to join the EMS as
soon as the capital markets of Europe are fully liberalised and inflation in
the UK has been cut to the European average. IL seems clear that the UK first
wants to see all obstacles to free intra-European trade in financial assets
removed before it gives up its monetary autonomy and joins the EMS. Hence, the
upshot of stage one as far as macroeconomic policy is concerned, is an
enlargement of the EMS, absence of capital controls throughout Europe and
possibly more intra-Community trade.
The main uncertainty around stage one is whether the large public sector
deficits and debt combined with large black economies imply a greater need for
seigniorage revenues in southern Europe and thus a danger for monetary end
exchange-rate stability within the EMS. The point is that in the past
speculative attacks on the currency have been fended off by capital controls,
especially by Italy and France, and by Belgíum with a dual exchange rate
system. However, once financial markets throughout Europe are opened up it
will no longer be possible for countries to peg their exchange rates and have
the freedom to set their domestic interest rates. It follows that the high-
deficit countries of southern Europe may be faced with a depreciating
currency. This is why some advocate a crawling peg between the currencies of3
southern and northern Europe (e.g., Dornbusch, 1988)~ However, the experience
of the Netherlands suggests that it is possible to k.ave a strong currency and
high levels of public sector deficits and debt when there are no restrictions
on international capital movements. As long as one is prepared to give up an
independent monetary policy, capital market liberalisation and fixed exchange
rates need not be incompatible (Gros, 1989)3. However, one could argue that
the Netherlands is in a stronger position than, say, Italy because De
Nederlandsche Bank has a much better reputation for an antí-inflationary
stance than the Banca d'Italia and because the Netherlands has a surplus
whilst Italy has a deficit on its current account vis-à-vis Germany.
Although the countries of the European Community seem to be committed to
stage one, the unce~rtainty described above as well as other uncertaintiea
provide reasons why some countriea do not necessarily wish to go ahead with
transition stages two and three proposed by the Delors Committee. Other
countries (e.g., Denmark and the UK) have some doubt about stages two and
three, because this may involve too much delegation of national powers to set
fiscal and monetary policy to European institutions. The more optimistic
countries (France, Italy and Spain) seem more enthusiastic about the EMU,
whilst the more realistic countries (Germany and the Netherlands) are willing
to go ahead as long as certain safe-guards (such as an independent ESCB) are
built in.
The second stage proposed by the Delora Committee requires a new Treaty
of Rome in order to delegate the responsibility for monetary policy to a
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and implies a considerable loss of
national sovereignity. During the second stage the progress of stage one must
be consolidated and reinforced, the EMS-bands must be narrowed, and rules for
the size and financing of public sector deficits must be decided upon at a
Community level. During the third and final stage intra-European exchange
rates must be supplemented with, and perhaps eventually replaced by, a single
European currency, the ESCB must determine monetary policy for Europe as a
whole and indirectly the value of the European currency vis-à-vis the dollar
and the yen, national public sector deficits must not be fínanced by printing
money and there may be limits on government borrowing from abroad, and the
Council of Ministers (together with the European Parliament) is able to adjust
the budgets of national governments when they would otherwise imply a danger
for monetary stability. The upshot of stages two and three of the proposals of
the Delors Committee seems to be the establishment of a monetary union with a
centralised monetary policy, a move away from German hegemony in monetary
policy, and some form of coordination of the fiscal policies of the various4
countries of the European Community.
As already mentioned, it is not clear that Europe will want to go along
the route of stages two and three proposed by the Delors Committee. Indeed,
some argue that once capital markets are fully liberalised it is better to
move to an EMS with wider bands for nominal exchange rates and others argue on
the basis of currency substitution that the market should decide whether one
EMS-currency will drive out all the other EMS-currenc s. The latter is
advocated by the British, but seems a rather fanciful idea. Yet another idea
is that the chances of the EMU being a success are greacest when Europe moves
directly from stage 1 to stage 3(Cukierman, 1989).
2. Transition phases and alternatives in the process of European Integration
It is useful for purposes of the following discussion about coordination
of macroeconomic policies to distinguist~ between various transition phases in
the process of European integration, and to also indicate various alternative
roads along which Europe can proceed. This list of transition phases partially
overlaps with the three stages proposed by the Delors Committee, but also
includes some alternative routes. The following phases can be distinguished
(see Table 1):
A. Low factor mobility, few international capital movements, managed
exchange rates with German hegemony, and uncoordinated budgetary
policies.
B. Low factor mobllity, more intra-Community trade (due to gradual removal
of barriers to trade), liberalisation of intra-Community trade in
financial assets, managed exchange rates with German hegemony,
enlargement of EMS membership, and uncoordinated budgetary policies.
C. (i) Low factor mobility, more intra-Community trade, free international
capital movements, managed exchange rates with German hegemony, narrowing
of EMS-bands, and coordination of budgetary policies.
(ii) Low factor mobility, more intra-Community trade, free international
capital movements, establishment of a ESCB without German hegemony which
decides on joint monetary policy, a further narrowing of bands for intra-
Community exchange rates, and coordination of budgetary policies.
(iii) Low factor mobility, more intra-Community trade, free international
capital movements, a ESCB without German hegemony and full monetary
union, and coordination of budgetary policies.
(iv) As (iii), but also the establishment of a budget-neutral EFfS.
D. (i) Low factor mobility, more intra-Community trade, free international
capital movements, establishment of a ESCB without German hegemony which5
decides on joint monetary policy and ensures narrowing of bands for
intra-Community exchange rates.
(ii) Low factor mobility, free international capital movements, and full
monetary union.
(iii) As (ii), but also coordination of budgetary policies end possibly
the establishment of a budget-neutral EF15.
E. High factor moh~lity, high proportion of intra-Community trade, free
international capital movements, and full economic end monetary union.
F. Low factor mobility, more intra-Community trade, free international
capital movements, widening of EMS-bands, crewling peg between southern
end northern Europe, uncoordinated budgetary policies end possibly a
system of dual exchange rates.
G. Low factor mobility, more intra-Community trade, free ínternational
capital movements, floating intra-Community exchange rates, and
uncoordinated budgetary policies.
Stage A captures the situation of the EMS since 1979. From the lst July
1990, most restrictions on international capital movements must be abolished,
Spain and perhaps the UK will have joined the EMS and there will be less
Table 1: Phases in the transition process towarda economic and monetary
integration
A. EMS
B. First stage of EMU: liberalisation of capital markets and completion
of the internal market for goods and services
C(i)-(iii). Advanced stage Low factor mobility C(iv). Establish
of the EMU: budgetary policy EFTS
coordination; narrowing of
EMS-bands until exchange rates
are irrevocably fixed;
establish ESCB
High factor mobility E. Ideal EMU
D(i)-(ii). Advanced stage of
the EMU: narrowing of EMS-bands
until exchange rates are irre- D(iii). Budgetary
vocably fixed; establish ESCB Low factor mobility policy coordina-
tion and possibly6
F. Widen EMS-bands; crawling
peg between southern and
northern Europe; dual exchange
rates





restrictions on intra-Community trade in goods and services so during 1990
Europe moves to stage B(the first stage of the Delors Committee). In
addition, it seems clear that the EMS currently operates as a hegemonic
Deutschemark bloc and that so far there is not much evidence of coordination
and cooperation in practice (cf., Cohen, Melitz and Oudiz, 1988; Giavazzi and
Giovannini, 198~, 1989a; Goodhart, 1989)4. Afterwards, various routes can be
followed. One possibility is that monetary and budgetary policies are
coordinated at a European level and subsequently this facilitates the move
towards the EMU, which corresponds to route C(i)-C(iii) and possibly C(iv).
The route to a more symmetric exchange-rate arrangement could be via the
founding of the FSCB with all member countries having a right to vote on the
common policy. An intermediate phase may be to appoint representatives of EMS-
countries on the board of the Bundesbank (Vaubel, 1987; Goodhart, 1989),
because this would gradually lead to less German hegemony as we115. The
problem with this proposal is that the new Bundesbank, with its co-opted
members from the rest of the EMS, may not be the same Bundesbank we know and
love so well (Kenen, 198~b). If factor mobility and in particular labour
mobility increases, one could move to stage E. However, if factor mobility is
low and exchange rates are irrevocably fixed, than one may want to consider
the establishment of a budget-neutral intra-Community transfer scheme (EFTS)
and move to stage C(iv) instead (e.g., Sachs and Sala-i-Martin, 1989).
An alternative way to proceed after stage B is to gradually proceed
towards full economic and monetary union and only afterwards, in the absence
of high factor mobility, coordinate budgetary policies and possibly establish
a EFTS. This corresponds to stages D(i)-D(iii), but when factor mobility ia
high one need not necessarily coordinate budgetary policies and establish a
EF15 so that one proceeds through stages D(i) and D(ii) to E. Yet another
alternative is to abolish the idea of moving towards full monetary union and,instead, widen exchange-rate bands and allow for a crawling peg between
southern and northern Europe in order to allow for a greater need of
seigniorage revenues in southern than in northern Europe (Dornbusch, 1988;
Canzoneri and Rogers, 1988)6. This means a move from B directly to F, but it
is not clear that this is a very sensible argument. The countries of southern
Europe, such as Italy, tend to have a large public nominal debt and thue have
s big temptation to ise surprise inflation to erode away the real value of
debt. In equilibrium the private sector anticipates this temptation and this
results in higher than optimal inflation; the EMS eliminates this inefficiency
and may thus be optimal for southern Europe even though it reduces the
revenues from seigniorage (Gros, 1988). A final alternative is of course to
move from stage B directly to a regime of floating exchange rates, stage G.
This disintegration of the EMS has the advantage that the intra-Community
exchange rates can be used as an adjustment mechanism for coping with country-
specific shocks in Europe. When the factor mobility within Europe remains low
and there is no coordination of budgetary policies and no willingness to have
a budget-neutral EFTS, there may be no alternative to stage G. This would be a
pity, because then the well-known advantages of a greater common currency area
(saving on exchange reserves, less exchange-rate risk, less information end
transaction costs, etc.) can not be reaped.
3. Convergence, coordination and harmonisation of macroeconomic policies
Coordination and convergence of macroeconomic policies within Europe are
stated objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The Council of Ministera made a
decision in 19~4 "for attainment of a high degree of convergence of economic
policies of Member States", which was meant to be mainly a process of setting
budgetary policy guidelines (e.g., Steinherr, 1984). In the report of the
Delors Committee the concepts of coordination and convergence play a prominent
role as well~. It is, however, not clear that convergence of policy
automatically implies international coordination of policies (and vice versa);
especially when there are country-specific shocks hitting Europe. Even when
everything is symmetric ( i.e., common shocks hitting a symmetric,
interdependent system of identical economies), one can converge either on a
non-cooperatíve or on a cooperative outcomel If it ia left to the market to
achieve convergence and powerful externalities are a fact of life, one may end
up in a worse situation than what one started off with. Hence, convergence of
economic policies does not necessarily seem to be a sensible objective on its
own. Obviously, one could argue that the EMS ought to contribute to a
progressive convergence of economic performance (e.g., a reduction in8
inflation differentials) because otherwise there may be a threat to monetary
and exchange-rate stability but such an argument has little to do with
coordination. Coordination refers to the joint and mutually consistent setting
of the national instruments of economic policy to maximise joint welfare of
the member states of the European Community. Conversely, lack of coordination
means that each country sets its own instruments of economic policy without
taking into account the consequences on welfare of other c ntries in Europe8.
Coordination does not necessarily imply convergence of economic policiea,
especially when individual member states are of different size, have
differential social and economic structures, have different preferences,
end~or are hit by different shocks. Convergence is, however, often used as an
excuse by individual governments to implement unpopular policies. In some
cases market forces can lead to convergence of economic outcomes and to the
desirability of convergence of economic policies. For example, if gross wages
are for some reason equal to a common marginal productivity of labour in each
of the member states, then perfect mobility of labour throughout Europe
implies that it is desirable for each individual government to converge on s
common tax rate on labour income. Even under these extreme and unrealistic
circumstances coordination is required to decide on which common tax rate to
converge, but in general it is not clear that convergence of tax policies and
budget deficits in itself is desirable. In fact, international competition in
its own right tends to drive tax rates down to a too low level.
International harmonisation of economic policies attempts to achieve
greater unity in economic structure, to increase the scope for rules, and to
reduce the scope for discretionary policies. Harmonisation is primarily
concerned with long-term objectives such as efficiency and distribution (e.g.,
commercial policy, anti-trust law, labour law, agricultural policy, regional
policy) rather than with the use of discretionary monetary and budgetary
policies for purposes of macroeconomic stabilisation. In short, harmonisation
is chiefly concerned with the promotion of free and non-monopolistic
competition and effícient markets throughout Europe. The completion of the
Internal European Market ("199z") is mainly concerned with harmonisation.
Harmonisation should also be concerned with the operation of economies; for
example, making labour markets more competitive and more responsive to shocks.
If this goal is achieved, this reduces the need for the European coordination
of budgetary and monetary policies.
International cooperation occurs, firstly, through the international
exchange of information, secondly, through international harmonisation of
rules, and thirdly, through international coordination of discretionary9
policies. Through the European Community, the OECD, the IMF and summit
meetings there is already a great deal of exchange of information. "1992" and
beyond provides a considerable amount of harmonisation. The Delors Report is
partially concerned with harmonisation and design of new rules of the game,
but important questions for the coming years are whether and how much
convergence and coordination of discretionary macroeconomic policies at a
community level is ~iesirable given the increasing degree of economic and
monetary integration of Europe. For example, whether and what kind of
coordination of budgetary policies is required under an economic and monetary
union in Europe.
4. Rules versus discretion
Two outcomes are often considered for decision making in dynamic
environments. The rules (or pre-commitment) outcome is relevant when the
monetary and fiscal authorities have sufficient discipline or reputation not
to succomb to time-inconsistent behaviour, whilst the discretionary outcome is
relevant when the authorities have no credibility and thus the private sector
anticipates that the authorities will renege on previously announced policies
whenever they have an incentive and get a chance to do so (Kydland and
Prescott, 19~~)9. Examples of a potential time-inconsistency problem occur
when workers are temporarily locked into nominal wage contracts or when
treasuries issue nominal debt, because then the government has an incentive to
engineer a surprise inflation and thereby erode the real wage and boost
employment or wipe out part of the real debt. Not surprisingly, in equilibrium
one ends up with higher inflation in the discretionary outcome. In most of
this report, the discussion is concerned with the rules outcome. However, when
the case for an independent ESCB (part III.3) or the counterproductivity of
international policy coordination (part IV.1) is discussed, the discretionary
outcome is considered as well.10
II. European coordination of macroeconomic policies during the various phases
of economic and monetary integration: Stabilisation aspects
This part considers the role of stabilisation policy and the need for
international policy coordination under alternative exchange-rate regimes.
Since the focus is most of the time on the optimal respor e to a situation of
stagflation, i.e., unemployment and rising prices cause3 by adverse supply
shocks, a standard multiple-country, short-run, Mundell-Fleming model is used
for the analysis in this part.
1. European coordination of monetary policiesl0
It seems reasonable to assume that there is nowadays little mobility of
labour within Europe, perfect capital mobilityll and imperfect substitution
between home and foreign goods in Europe. Three regimes will be considered:
(1) managed exchange rates (development of the EMS according to the first
stage of the proposals of the Delors Committee, phase B); (2) monetary union
(advanced stage of the EMU, phase C(iii) or D(ii)); and (3) floating exchange
rates (FLOAT, step G). The EMS is the status quo for Europe, which can either
develop into the EMU (cf., routes A, B, C or D) or there is a danger that it
gradually breaks down into a FLOAT (cf., routes A, B, F or G). Since the
breakdown of Bretton Woods the exchange-rate regime between Europe end the US
was a FLOAT, but more recently (witness the New York Plaza Summit in 1985 and
subsequently the Tokyo Summit in 1986, and the Louvre Accord and Venice Summit
in 1987), an era of coordinated exchange-rate management for the global
economy has gradually replaced a clean FLOAT (e.g., PPC, 1988; Funabashi,
1988; Kenen, 1989).
It is best to start with the need for international coordination under
the hypothetical situation that Europe is characterised by a FLOAT. One could
think that, when there is full employment, there is no reason for member
states to coordinate their monetary policies. The reason is that the exchange
rates adjust to ensure equilibrium in the balances of payments, so that each
country can conduct an independent monetary policy and set the growth in its
nominal money supply equal to its real growth rate plus its desired inflation
ratel2. However, there may well be a public-finance motive (van der Plceg,
1988b) or a Mundell-Tobin motive (van der Ploeg, 1990a)13 for international
policy coordination in a market-clearing world with floating exchange rates.
In any case, this view definitely does not hold when one departs from the
fairy-tale world and considers a world plagued by wide-spread unemployment.11
When unemployment is caused by the downward rigidity of nominal wages, both at
home and abroad, the Mundell-Fleming model is the most appropriate
frameworkly. A monetary expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, because
the downward pressure on interest rates and incipient capital outflows induces
a depreciation of the exchange rate and thus booats net exports at the expense
of foreign output and employment. However, the monetary expansion raises
import and thus consumers' prices and depresses real income (defined as the
nominal wage deflated by the consumers' price index) at home and boosts real
income abroad. It is assumed that countries are faced with adverse supply
shocks so that they are faced with atagflation and muat be concerned about
achieving employmant on lhe one hand and fighting inflation and maintaining a
satisfactory level of real income on the other hand.
1.1 Stagflation caused by common supply shocks
Consider the problem of stagflation caused by a European-wide adverse
supply shock (e.g., an oil-price hike). It then follows that, under the
hypothetical case of a FLOAT and in the absence of European policy
coordination, each country has a too tight monetary stance leading to too high
interest rates and excessive unemployment rates. The reason is that under a
FLOAT each central bank attempts to export inflation by appreciating its
exchange rate. Coordination recognises that such competitive appreciations are
futile, avoids beggar-thy-neighbour attempts to appreciate the currency end
thus leads to looser monetary policies and full employment (e.g., Oudiz and
Sachs, 1984; Canzoneri and Henderson, 1987)15.
One of the main advantages of a symmetric regime of irrevocably fixed
exchange rates such as the EMU over a FLOAT is that international conflicts
about the intra-European exchange rates and the distribution of inflation are
avoided. More precisely, fixing exchange rates under a EMU can be viewed as a
substítute f'oc~ internationcrl policy coordination. In fact, when the member
states are symmetric and are hit by identical ehocka, EMU reproduces exactly
the outcome that prevails when central banka coordinate their monetary
policies under a clean FLOAT or an adjustable-peg regime such as the EMS. When
member states are not identical, EMU is only a partial substitute for
international monetary policy coordination under a FLOAT.
Many view the EMS as an asymmetric exchange-rate system, because the
Bundesbank enjoys monetary hegemony (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989a). This
means that in the EMS the Bundesbank sets the money supply and the other
central banks peg their currencies to the Deutschemark at a given rate. Hence,
once capital markets are liberalised, they give up control of their money12
supply. For example, if there is an Italian balance-of-payments deficit and
pressure on the lira to depreciate, the Banca d'Italia must sell foreign
reserves and buy up lira ín order to defend the currency and meet the demand
from importers. Since sterilisation (buying of bonds on the open market by the
monetary authorities) is impossible once capital markets are fully
liberalised, the Italian money supply falls to the extent of Italy's balance-
of-payments deficit. Under such a system, a tighteninc ~f German monetary
policy must imply a tightening of Italian monetary policy, else the lira will
have to depreciate. When the Bundesbank ralses interest rates, De
Nederlandsche Bank usually follows suit within a couple of hours! Clearly, as
long as the Netherlands sticks to a given guilder-Deutschemark rate, it will
not be able to conduct an independent monetary policy. This is the price one
pays for obtaining the credibility of the Bundesbank. The macroeconomic trade-
offs and spill-over effects are very different under this asymmetric
characterisation of the EMS than under the more symmetric arrangement of a
FLOAT or the EMU16. An increase in the German money supply leads to a
corresponding increase in the money supplies of the other countries of the EMS
and thus to a larger fall in European interest rates because the non-German
central banks are defending themselves against an appreciating currency.
Employment throughout the EMS increases due to the increase in consumption and
investment arising from lower interest rates, hence a German monetary
expansion is now a locomotive policy. A devaluation of a non-German currency
is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, because it boosts net exports at the expense
of German employment and output. The European money stock increases, so that
interest rates fall throughout the EMS. The non-German cost of living
increases, whilst the German cost of líving falls.
Returning to the problem of European-wide stagflation caused by an
adverse supply shock, absence of coordination of monetary policies in the EMS
with German hegemony implies that the non-German central banks use a real
appreciation oF their exchange ratesl~ to disinflate away the adverse
consequences of the supply shock so that the Bundesbank expands its money
supply by more than the rest of Europe (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989b; van
der Ploeg, 1989c). The reason is that, when the Bundesbank expanda its money
supply, the rest of the EMS enjoys an increase in employment and output and
thus can afford to revalue their currencies and pay more attention to their
cost-of-living targets. Monetary stances throughout the EMS are tighter than
under the EMU. Germany achieves full employment, but experiences a severe
increase in its relative cost of labour. The rest of Europe still suffers from
unemployment, but manages to soften the blow to real income. The exchange-rate13
realigment allows the rest of Europe to reduce the damege to its welfare at
the expense of Germany. The move from EMS to EMU benefits Cermany, worsens the
welfare of the rest of Europe, but makes Europe as a whole better off. Money
supplies increase by more under the EMU than under the EMS, ao the supply
shock hny n ono-for-ono impnct on the coat of livíng and loavea unomployment
throughoul Europe unaffected. Ilonce, even in a non-cooperative EMS conaiating
of identical countrics hit by identical shocks, the exchange rate will be
realigned from time to time, so that the view that the completion of a common
macket for Europe ("1992" and all that) leads to homogeneous structures and
thus by itself creates a lasting monetary union is fallaciousi8. However, if
in addition monetary policies are coordinated within the EMS, the movement
towards the EMU will be facilitated. A corollary is that German leadership of
the EMS is no substitute for monetary policy cooperation in Europe.
Finally, consider the break-down of the EMS into a(non-cooperative)
FLOAT. When countries are conservative, i.e., care relatively more about the
cost of living than unemployment, Germany prefers the EMS to a FLGAT, else,
Germany prefers a FLOAT. As far as average European welfare is concerned, the
EMS is preferred to a FLOAT. The reason is, of course, that the EMS avoids to
a certain extent the competitive, futile attempts to appreciate the currencies
and thus leads to looser monetary stances and less unemployment.
1.2 Country-specific shocks: A case for a EFTS
The answer to the question which exchange-rate regime allows individual
governments to best achieve their national objectives without an explicít need
for international policy coordinatíon is important and dependa crucially on
both the origin and the nature of the ahocks hitting the various countriea of
Europe (e.g., Canzoneri and Gray, 1985; McKibbin and Sachs, 1986; 1988; Kenen,
198~a; 1988; van der Ploeg, 1989c).
So far, the non-cooperative responses of monetary policies to a common
adverse supply shock under three alternative exchange-rate regimes for Europe
have been considered. The main finding has been that for such a shock the EMU
(or a fully coordinated FLOAT) is the preferred arrangement for exchange-rate
management. A second-best exchange-rate regime may be the EMS, because then at
least the futile, non-cooperative attempts to appreciate the currency and
export inflation by tightening monetary policy that occur under a non-
cooperative FLOAT are also to a certain extent avoided.
However, when there is an asymmetric demand shock, say a shift in
preferences away from, say, British goods towards French gooda, matters are
not so simple. The initial effects of this shock are unemployment and a trade14
deficit for Britain and over-employment and a trade surplus for France. If
labour markets throughout Europe function properly, then British wages fall
immediately and French wages increase to ensure full employment. If this is
the case, one should proceed to the EMU and reap all the benefits of s greater
common currency area (lower transaction costs, lower information costs, no
exchange-rate risk, saving on exchange reserves, etc.) (Goodhart, 1988).
Alternatively, if nominal wage rigidities prevent bour markets from
adjusting immediately to full employment, then workers may migrate from
Britain to France and restore balance in this way. The Delors Committee puts a
lot of emphasis on this adjustment mechanism, but the idea of British people
moving across the Channel to France in order to find a job when they don't
even move from the North to the South of England for a job seems a bit
unrealistic. Although intra-European migration of unskilled labour (especially
from Italy to northern Europe) was significant during the period 1960-74, when
foreign labour was essential to the fast growing economies of Europe and when
governments established bureaus to recruit migrant workers, migration among
member states of the European Community has decreased since the Treaty of Rome
(especially articles 7 and 48ff) became effective (Molle and van Mourik,
1988). Foreigners now consitute only about 2 percent of the labour force in
Europe, so it seems fair to entertain some doubt about a significant degree of
intra-European labour mobility. Unfortunately, Europe is neither characterised
by a smooth functioning of its labour markets nor by high degrees of labour
mobility (due to differences in language and culture)~9 and therefore some
form of policy adjustment may be required. First-best policies should promote
more responsive labour markets and more labour mobility, so that there
certainly is a role for structural policy improving the functioning of labour
markets while mitigating adjustment costs for migrating labourers.
The most obvious second-best policy adjustment, in the absence of wage
flexibility and labour mobility, is then a loosening of monetary policy in
Britain, a tightening of monetary policy in France and a depreciation of the
pound-franc rate for this boosts net exports of Britain to France and restores
equilibrium. Of course, this is not possible under the EMU with irrevocably
fixed exchange rates whilst it is only possible to a limited extent under the
EMS. Alternatively, Britain might loosen its budgetary policy and France might
tighten its budgetary policy. However, there is a danger that politicians will
go along with the idea, advanced by the Delors Committee, that there should be
constraints on too high budget deficits, where "too high" presumably means
that there is a danger that deficits get monetísed and thus that there is a
threat to monetary and exchange-rate stability. Budgetary stances, once15
corrected for full employment, are then likely to be pro-cyclícal under the
EMU. These are the main reasons why in the presence of asymmetric real shocks
a FLOAT is to be preferred to the EMU or, to a lesser extent, to the EMS. The
case for a FLOAT is convincing (as Mrs. Thatcher repeatedly seems to auggeat)
when shocks consist of shifts in preferences, but if nevertheless the
traditional adventages of a greater common currency area are large enough to
warrant the move towsrds EMU then another form of policy adjustment muat be
used.
One possibility is that the establishment of a EMU must go hand in hand
with the establishment of a European Federal Transfer Scheme (EFTS), perhapa
not unlike the system envisaged by the MacDougall Report of April 19~~. The
political merits of a EFT'S should be clear, because it ensures an equitable
distribution of the gains and losses of the EMU20, it responds to basic
citizenship rights of people living in the EMU, and it fits in with the
principle of horizontal budgetary equity. It also fita in with the prínciple
of subsidiarity, because the job of arranging such transfers can not be left
to individual governments. The task of the EFTS is to make exchange-rate
changes unnecessary by transferring income from one country to another country
when there are such shifts in preferences (e.g., Sachs and Sala-i-Martin,
1989). In practice, the scheme operates by transferring income from
individuals of one nation to individuals of another nation and replaces, to a
certain extent, the national unemployment compensation schemes. One could
envisage a Community-wide tax, which in itself would act as an automatic
stabiliser, whose proceeds are used to finance a Community-wide unemployment
compensation scheme. It is crucial that such a version of the EFTS is budget-
neutral. To be more precies, the budget of the EFfS should be intertemporally
balanced so that taxes are smoothed (see Part III) and that in time of a boom
debt, which was accumulated in time of a recession, is paid off. It is a pity
that the Delors Report does not contain any recommendations for the
establishment of a EFTS, because without it regional imbalances induced by
shifts in preferences may persist21 (for example, initial estimates suggest
that one third of state-specific shocks in the US seem to be cushioned by
federal transfers).
The reason for this reluctance to recommend a EFTS is that there may be
strong incentive arguments against a EFTS, because unemployed individuals are
then even less likely to pack their bags and find a job elsewhere in Europe
and individual governments are less likely to pursue a rigorous and effective
unemployment policy. In other words, a EFTS signala to the bargaining process
that real wages can be kept high, provides en invitation for free riding on16
European funds, and gives a fiscal incentive for government failure. These are
strong arguments against a EFTS to do with moral hazard and sometimes with
adverse selection. They must be taken seriously, but at the same time it must
be realised that they can be rallied against national unemployment
compensation schemes as well. Most of these incentive problems can be overcome
by changing the rules of national schemes in such a way that benefits are only
handed out to the unemployed, if the unemployed at the s~ time have the duty
to accept a job even when the job is not in his or her field of training (not
unlike the Swedish model). If necessary, the schemes can then provide top-up
payments to provide an acceptable standard of livíng. Obviously, the EFTS
should be subject to similar rules of the game.
It must be pointed out that the EFTS should operate as a transfer scheme
and thus should not affect the overall budget of the European Community22,
that without the EFfS the budgetary policies of the individual treasuries may
be pro-cyclical, and that it may be possible to design incentive rules that
avoid these problems of moral hazard. The most obvious incentive rule is to
give conditional transfers. For example, transfers to a depressed region
should occur on the condition that funds are allocated to training and
schooling programmes for the unemployed~3. In addition, it will be important
to harmonise the criteria for being eligible to benefit from the national
unemployment schemes as well as from the EFTS. Empirical evídence suggests
that country-specific shocks are important for Europe, so despite all its
problems establishment of a EETS may increase the chances of moving to
irrevocably fixed exchange rates in Europe. If Europe is unwilling to
introduce a EFTS, then individual countries have a duty to give a much greater
role to supply-side policies in order to ensure that national labour markets
clear and get rid of unemployment through the market mechanism in a painless
and expedient manner.
However, when asymmetric shocks correspond to adverse country-specific
supply shocks, the case for a FLOAT and thus for the EFI'S is a bit more
subtle. The reason is that such a shock leads both to unemployment and to
hígher prices and a lower real income (stagflation) at home so that on the one
hand a depreciation of the currency is required as this leads to more
employment but on the other hand an appreciation of the currency is required
to depress prices and raise real income. It is therefore not clear whether a
depreciation or an appreciation of the currency is desirable from a welfare
point of view. This is the familiar dilemma one faces when one is stuck with
stagflation. In a FLOAT the excess demand for home goods induces an immediate
appreciation oF the real exchange rate to its new long-run value end a cut in17
the wedge between consumers' end producers' prices, so tha~ the fall in real
income is cushioned compared with the outcome under the EMU (without a F.FTS).
The counterpart is that the other countries suffer a greater fall in real
income. Of course, the falls in employment and output are accelerated whilst
the other countries enjoy s temporary increase in employment and output as a
result of the appreciation of the exchange rate. Hence, in the face of en
adverse supply shock, the EMU (without a EF'I5) copes better with unemployment
than with real incomez4. The reason is that the FMU leads to an expansion of
the stock of money balances at home and a contraction abroad.
As far as the EMS is concerned, an adverse supply ahock in German,y leads
to a much sharper fall in German employment than the fall induced in, say,
French employment by a French supply shock. In addition, a German supply
detoriation leads to unemployment in the rest of Europe whilat an adverae
aupply ahock in the rest of Europe leads to over-employment in Germany. The
reason is that in the first case the central banks of the reat of Europe
defend their currencies by buying them up and tightening their monetary policy
whilst in the latter case the central banks of the rest of Europe prevent
their currencies from appreciating by buying Deutschemarks and loosening their
monetary policy. The adverse effects on real income are symmetric, because the
greater increase in French wages arising from a French shock is exactly set-
off by less of a fall (actually an increase) in German wagea so that the
effect of a French supply shock on the real exchange rate is exactly the
opposite of the effect of a German supply shock.
As far as average European welfare is concerned, the welfare ranking in
decreasing order of magnitude is a cooperative FLOAT, a cooperative EMS, a
non-cooperative EMS, a non-cooperative FLOAT and the EMU (without a EFTS). The
EMU (without s EFTS) performs so badly because appreciation of the exchange
rete can no longer be used as an instrument to remove the excesa demand for
home goods. As a result the greater expansion of the home money aupply leads
to a larger increase ín prices, a larger fall in (and overshooting of) real
income and less unemployment than in the regimes where the exchange rate is
allowed to appreciate. Hence, the occurrence of country-specific shocks makes
the EMU (without a EFTS) an undesirable regime. There is not much difference
between a cooperative and a non-cooperative FLOAT. Zn the former case the home
money supply expands somewhat more, which leads to somewhat smaller output
losses and higher losses in real income. As far as the EMS is concerned, when
Germany is hit by a supply shock, it expands its money supply by more than
when the rest of Europe is hit by s supply shock, so that this leads to
smaller output losses and larger losses in real income for Germany.i8
The main conclusion that sticks out, as far as stabilisation policy is
concerned, however, is that EMU (without a EFTS) performs badly when member
states are hit by country-specific shocks and performs well when member states
are hit by common shocks25. One could argue that this provides a case for the
EFI'S, unless budgetary and structural policies are both viable and achieve the
objective of full employment.
2. European coordination of budgetary policies26
Now consider the use of fiscal policy to fight the short-run problem of
stagflation caused by a common adverse supply shock in an interdependent world
with nominal wage rigidities. This is a short-run analysis, so the dynamics of
government debt are ignored (see, however, Part II for a discussion of debt
dynamics). Under the hypothetical case of a FLOAT a fiscal expansion in one
country leads to higher interest rates, an appreciation of its real exchange
rate, a boost in real income at home and a decline abroad, and an increase in
employment at home and abroad. This is the standard two-country Mundell-
Fleming story. Treasuries want full employment, high levels of real income and
budgetary balance. It follows that, in the absence of international
cooperation, right-wing (left-wing) treasuries who care relatively more about
the cost of living (unemployment) have too loose (tight) fiscal stances and
thus end up with excessive levels of employment (unemployment) relative to the
cooperative outcome2~. The reason is that right-wing (left-wing) governments
do not internalise the adverse (beneficial) effects of a fiscal expansion on
the foreign cost of living (on foreign unemployment). Clearly, international
cooperation leads right-wing (left-wing) governments to tighten (loosen) their
fiscal stance.
Under the EMS it is now assumed that the Bundesbank ensures a stable
money supply and the other central banks of the EMU ensure relatively fixed
intra-European nominal exchange rates. Budgetary policies must then be used to
fight the problem of stagflation. Since a fiscal expansion can no longer
affect real income through the real exchange rate (as prices are fixed in the
short run and nominal exchange rates are irrevocably fixed), the EMS avoids
competitive, futile attempts to appreciate the exchange rate and may thus be
superior to a FLOAT. As far as spill-over effects are concerned, a fiscal
expansion outside Germany is a locomotive policy whilst a German fiscal
expansion is less effective and less of a locomotive, perhaps even a beggar-
thy-neighbour, policy. In the former case the excess deman3 for non-German
goods is accomodated by an increase in the non-German money supply and the
excess demand for money in Germany is choked off by a rise in Europeen19
interest rates, which causes some crowding out. In the lat:.er case the non-
German money supplies fall, as the non-German central banks are selling
Deutschemarks in order to prevent their currencies from depreciating, which
reduces, and may even reverse, the increase in non-German employmentl It
follows that, in the absence of cooperation, fiscal stances will be too
tight28 and that Germany has a tighter fiscal stence than the rest of Europe.
Hence, the EMS has a built-in deflationary bias for budgetary stabilisation
policies~9 end the price one pays for German hegemony in monetary policy is
that Germany cannot be relied upon to be the "locomotive engine of growth"
that pulls Europe out of a recession. Nevertheless, the EMS may be superior to
e FLOAT since it avoids competitive attempts to appreciate the currency and
export inflation. A typical welfare ranking, from a pure macroeconomic
stabilisation point of view, in decreasing order is: cooperetive EMS,
cooperative FLOAT, non-cooperative EMS, non-cooperative FLOAT.
Countries with a large surplus on the current account and a modest public
debt, such as Germany, should play a greater role in a coordinated supply-
friendly budgetary expansion for Europe (Drèze and Wyplosz, 1988). Supply-
friendly is important, because a number of economists fear that Europe may
suffer from a capital shortage once demand is expanded. Hence, the
prescription is for the government to invest in, say, infrastructure and RáD.
The irony is that Germany has very little incentive under the EMS to be an
"engine of growth" for Europe30.
Under the EMU with an independent ESCB which pursues a stable European
money supply and guarantees irrevocably fixed intra-European exchange rates,
budgetary policies are essential in order to stabilise the economy in the face
of stagflation caused by common, adverse supply shocks3l. A fiscal expansion
in one of the countries raises interest rates throughout Europe and crowds out
some of the initial gains in employment due to the fiscal expansion.
Employment in the other countries increases when the beneficial effects on net
exports outweigh the adverse effects of crowding out. This is likely to happen
as the goods markets of Europe become more and more integrated, so that there
is a danger that fiscal stabilisation responses will be too weak relative to
the cooperative outcome. It is easy to show that Germany then has no incentive
to lose the monetary hegemony it enjoys under the EMS, whilst the rest of
Europe is keen to move towards the EMU.
If wages are fully indexed to conaumers' prices (and everything else is
indexed), monetary policy and thus the particular nominal exchange-rate regime
in force are irrelevant for real outcomes. A fiacal expansion is a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy, because it induces an appreciation of the real exchange rateZo
and thus cuts consumers' prices and wages at home and boosts wages abroad.
Hence, absence of cooperation in the face of a common adverse supply shock,
leads to excessive budgetary stances as treasuries attempt in vain to export
unemployment (Branson and Rotemberg, 1980; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; van der
Ploeg, 1988a).
III. European coordination of macroconomic policies durir the various phases
of economic and monetary integration: Public-finance aspects32
This part considers the public-finance and allocative aspects of economic
and monetary integration in Europe. The basic framework that is adopted is the
one of tax and seigniorage smoothing (Barro, 1979; Mankiw, 198~), extended to
see what happens under a FLOAT, the EMS (Grilli, 1988) and the EMU. Individual
treasuries and central banks minimise the present value of the deadweight
burdens associated with the various sources of revenues subject to the
intertemporal government budget constraint. Attention is also paid to the
externalities associated with using the foreign debt of Europe to smooth
consumption in individual countries of the EMU. No particular attention is
paid to the use of stabilisation policy in the fight against unemployment,
since the emphasis is on medium-run issues of allocation and of public
finance. Unemployment manifests itself in a higher level of desired public
spending, but the role of fiscal policy in reducing unemployment is not
considered here. The objective of this part is to discuss the allocation and
public-finance aspects of international policy coordination; in the past most
of the attention has been focussed on the stabilisation role of macroeconomic
policy.
1. Tax and seigniorage smoothing under the EMS
One of the most important rules derived in the theory of public finance
is that tax rates should be smoothed over time and that government debt should
be allowed to increase whenever public spending exceeds its permanent level. A
war or temporarily high level of unemployment justifies government borrowing.
However, as long as public investment bears a market rate of return, it does
not affect the permanent level of the public primary deficit and thus the
treasury is allowed to borrow for investment purposes. A balanced current
budget and borrowing only for investment is often referred to as the "golden"
rule of public finance. When seigniorage is also a source of public revenues,
inflation and nominal interest rates should go up and down together with tax
rates and all of them should be smoothed over time. In other words, when theu
real interest rate equals the pure rate of time preference, the theory of
public finance says that inflation and tax ratea should follow a random walk
because only then the marginal distortíons of the various ways of raising
revenues are equalised. The random-walk property implies that the best
estimate of tomorrow's tax rate, given all the information that is available
today, equals today's tax rate. It is in thia precise sense that tax and
inflation rates are smoothed over time; of course, ahocks can cause quite a
lot of variation in ,:ax and inflation rates over time. The above arguments
hold for a closed economy or for a small open economy with a FLOAT, but not
necessarily for the EMS. Under the EMS countries other than Germany peg their
exchange rate to the Deutschemark and give up an independent monetary policy
in order to obtain low inflation through the strong diacipline of the
Bundesbank (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988), but this meena that they can
extract less seigniorage and end up with a sub-optimal government revenue mix
and a too low level of the public spending. Of courae, this argument should
not just be viewed in this narrow public finance perspective. Generally
speaking, benefits accrue from higher inflation (e.g., it may be easier to
keep real wages down) and thus in a broader perspective they end up worse off.
In order to flesh out the above arguments, it is worthwhile to construct a
simple model.
The government's intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
d t PV(g) - PV(t t pm)
where d, g and m denote, respectively, the levels of public debt, exhaustive
public spending and real money balances ( all expressed as fractions of the
national income), t denotes the direct tax rate, p denotes the rate of
inflation (or the growth in the nominal supply of high-powered money), and
PV{g) denotes the present value of the stream of future levels of g calculated
with the aid of the real interest rate corrected for real growth in the
national income, say r, which is (as capital markets are fully liberalised)
determined on the world market. In plain words, solvency of the government's
fínances requires that the current public debt plua the present value of
future levels of exhaustive public spending must match the present value of
the stream of future tax and seigniorage revenues. The absence of capital
market imperfections means that public debt can be used as a smoothing device.
The government does this by choosing tax rates, monetary growth rates and
public spending levels by solving:22
minimise PV[blt2 t b2p2 t b3(g-gd)2 ' b4(P-P~)2~
where gd and p~ denote the desired level of exhaustive public spending and the
German inflation rate, respectively. Hence, the gnvernment minimises the
excess burden caused by taxation and inflation33, attempts to maintain a
desired level of spending, and at the same time attempts to achieve an
intermediate target by stabilising the nominal value of i currency vis-à-via
the Deutschemark in order to converge to the German inflation rate. Germany
r
has independent monetary policy (b4-0), but for the other EMS-countries b4
indicates the weight they attach to the EMS-anchor34. For the Netherlands b~
is very large, but for Britain b4 is small. The optimality of the government
revenue mix is measured by the first three terms, whilst the fourth term
measures an intermediate target associated with monetary discipline (see
Section 3.1).
The first-order conditions show that t must follow a random walk and that
two optimality relationships must be satisfied:
P'(blmt f byP~)I(b2 t b4) and bit ' b3(gd-g).
Hence, the marginal cost of direct taxes and of inflation (per unit of real
money balances) must equal the marginal benefit of exhaustive public spending.
For Germany and to a lesser extent Britain, b4 is negligible and consequently
inflation and tax rates go up and down together, but for the EMS-followers b4
is substantial and consequently their inflation rates are tied to the German
rate which leads to a sub-optimal government revenue mix (more precisely, the
combined costs associated with bl, b2 and b3 go up when b4 increases).
Exhaustive public spending goes up whenever taxes go down, and vice versa,
because the first-order conditions demand that whenever the marginal
distortions associated with taxation diminish, the marginal benefits
associated with exhaustive public spending must diminish as well.
Upon substitution into the government's intertemporal budget constraint,
one obtains (after a suitable normalisation):
t-(b2 t by)(rd ' gP) - b4 m PP
where the permanent level of desired exhaustive public spending is defined as
gP :- rPV(gd) and pp :- rPV(p~). The government's ínflation-corrected deficit
(change in d) then follows as23
rd f g- t- pm '(Bd - Bp) - Lbyl(b2'b4)~ m(Pr - pp).
A permanent increase in the desired level of exhaustive public spending
requires higher tax and seigniorage revenues, but a temporary increese is
fully met and financed by borrowing. An anticipated increeae in the deaired
level of exhaustive public spending leads to en increeae in taxes, a cut in
spending today and public saving. A permanent increase in German inflation
leads to more seigniorage and thus allows a cut in taxes and en increase in
exhaustive public spending, but a temporary increase in German inflation
leaves the tax rates and level of exhaustive public spending unaffected, leads
to a bigger increase in inflation and seigniorage revenues, and thus ellows
some public debt to be paid off.
The general point is that, when there is a need to raise revenues for the
public sector, there is a trade-off between zero tax distortions and zero
inflation leading to both a positive tax rate and a positive inflation rate
(Phelps, 19~3). However, a strong commitment to the intermediate target of
defending the currency within EMS-bands (high value of b4) induces a sub-
optimal public revenue mix, i.e., too high taxes and too low inflation (as
measured by the terms in bl and b2), and a too low level of exhaustive public
spending (as measured by the term in b3). In this sense, the price one pays
for joining the EMS is a too small size of the public sector35,
Perhaps, it is wocthwhile to discuss at thia juncture why some economiats
think that there are important public-finance reasons against moving from the
EMS with managed exchange rates to the EMU with irrevocably fixed exchange
rates (Dornbusch, 1988; Canzoneri and Rogera, 1988). Their point is that the
countries of southern Europe, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, have
relatively a much greater need for seigniorage revenues than the countries of
northern Europe and that a fixed exchange rate deprives the countries of
southern Europe from a potentially important source of public revenues-
seigniorage. The reason is that the countries of southern Europe have much
higher costs of tax collection and a larger black economy (proxied by a
relatively high value of bl), so that the optímal rulea for public finance
then immediately give rise, ceteris paribus, to higher inflation rates and
lower direct tax rates (see above). The first-best policy is, of course, to
get rid of the black economy, reduce the costs of tax collection and thus
enable oneself to cut the inflation rate. One could argue that a second-best
policy is to have a crawling peg between the currencies of northern and
southern Europe as this would accomodate the required differential in
inflation rates. Although this seems to provide a convincing publíc-finance24
case against narrowing EMS-bands and moving to the EMS, section 3 will argue
that the argument may not hold water.
2. Competition among the central banks and treasuries of a monetary union
The previous section discussed the public-Finance implications of the
EMS. The remaining sections of this part focus on the EMU. This section pays
attention to a monetary union with a dependent system of -~tra1 banks, whilst
section 3 presents the case for an independent ECB. Section 4 assumes the
existence of an independent ECB, whose sole task it is to maintain price
stability throughout Europe, and concentrates attention on the scope for
independent budgetary policies to be conducted by the individual treasuries.
In particular, three externalities are identified in section 4 which all go in
the direction of a too low level of exhaustive public spending. Before this
can be done, it is however worthwhile to see the problems that occur when a
monetary union does not have an independent system of central banks.
Consider a monetary union of N countries, denoted by the subscript i-
1,...,N, whose system of central banks is run by the various treasuries and is
thus not independent. There is a common inflation rate, p, and exchange rates
within the union are irrevocably fixed. The government of country i solves:
minimise PVCblt2 t b2P2 4 b3(gi - g~)2] s.t. di 4 PV(gi) - PV(ti i si),
where si is the amount of seigniorage taken by treasury i from the common
central bank. Individual governments are, in contrast to the rather odd
recommendation of the Delors Committee for guidelines on public sector
deficits, free to borrow as long as they remain solvent. It also needs to take
account of the budget constraint of the dependent system of central banks: sl
t s2 t... t sN - pmN. The main externality is, of course, that the
seigniorage each treasury grabs from the system of central banks leads to
higher inflation for all the other countries of the monetary union as well.
In the non-cooperative outcome (denoted by a superscript N)
b1tN - b3(g~ - gN) - ( b2ImN)PN. i - 1, .. , N
must hold and tax rates and thus inflation rates must follow a random walk. As
before, inflation and tax retes go up and down together and move in the
opposite direction oF the level of exhaustive public spending. In addition,
since there is a common inflation rate and the costs of tax collection and the
parameters in the welfare-loss are assumed to be the same across countries,25
tax rates must be the seme in all countries of the EMII as well, even though
levels of desired public spending and public debt may vary from country to
country! (Of course, when the costs of collecting taxes is much higher in one
country than in the rest of the EMU, its optimal tax r.ate will be lower than
in the rest of the EMU). In the cooperative outcome (denoted by a auperscript
C) the treasuries internalise the adverse external effects from grabbing more
seigniorage so that
blt~ - b3(B~ - gi) - (b2~m) PC. i - 1, .. , N
must hold: the marginal distortion from collecting seigniorage revenues ia N
times as large as under the non-cooperative outcome. The case of an
independent system of central banks (denoted by a superscript I) is relevant
when monetary policy is set such as to maintain price stability throughout the
region and thus corresponds to zero inflation, pI-O, whilst the fiacal
authorities have no option but to accept this and given this find it optimal
to let taxes follow a random walk.
Upon substitution into the treasuries' intertemporal budget constraints,
one can show that
pN -(rdtgP)~[mt(b~mN)] exceeds pC -(rd4gp)~[mt(b~m)] exceeds pI a 0
where b- b2(bil ~ b31), d denotes the average of the di, and gp denotes the
average of the g~p. Conflict between the treasuries of a monetary union
without an independent common central bank leads each of them to grab too much
seigniorage, which pushes up inflation for the whole region36. International
coordination of monetary and budgetary policiea leads to lower monetary growth
and inflation, higher tax rates and lower levels of exhaustive public spending
for each of the countries of the union, because the seigniorage-inflation
externalities are now internalised. An independent system of central banks
must be governed by ultra-conservative central benkers and thus achievea a
stable price level, so that the treasuries must make up for this loss in
seigniorage revenues by resorting to higher tax rates and lower levels of
exhaustive public spending than would be the case under s cooperative
dependent system of central banks. It is easy to show that the highest welfare
is achieved when the various ministers of finance coordinate their budgetary
and monetary policies in a dependent system of central banks, whilat the
lowest welfare is achieved under an independent system of central banks.26
3. The case for an independent FSCB: Rules versus discretion
If an independent ESCB leads to a sub-optimal government revenue mix, a
decline in public spending and consequently performs so badly compared with a
non-cooperative, dependent ESCB and a fortiori with a cooperative, dependent
ESCB, why then does the Delors Committee strongly advocate an independent ESCB
based on the German (and Dutch) model?37
The answer must, of course, be that one is afraid t t a dependent ESCB
is likely to succomb to pressure from individual ministers of finance to
finance their levels of public spending. An independent ESCB is by many
believed to be the only viable means of ensuring a strong and undeniable
monetary discipline. More precisely, an independent ESCB, whose primary task
it is to preserve price stability, is not going to either levy a surprise
inflation tax in order to wipe out the real value of outstanding nominal
public debt or to increase the money supply in order to accomodate the demand
from ministers of finance for more public spending or to accomodate the demand
from uniona For higher wages38. Since minísters of finance, unions and other
agents anticipate that an independent ESCB is not going to give in to their
demands, they settle for less and as a result inflation in equilibrium is
lower than it would be under a dependent ESCB without much monetary
discipline. This is the main reason why central bankers - the main signatories
of the report produced by the Delors Committee - are very much in favour of an
independent ESCB: they dislike inflation more than anything else and an
autonomous body for setting monetary policy is the best way to achieve a
stable price level!
In view of the above discussion, it must be clear that it is much more
relevant to compare non-cooperative and cooperative discretionary outcomes
under s dependent ESCB with the rules outcome under an independent ESCB. In
other words, to assess the case for an independent ESCB, one should trade off
the disadvantage of a sub-optimal government revenue mix and a lower level of
exhaustive public spending against the advantage of a better monetary
discipline and the lower inflstion this brings with it.
It is possible to think of at least three potentisl sources of time
inconsistency that may be relevant for a ESCB. The first is when workers are
locked into nominal wage contracts and the central bank reneges by eroding the
real value of the wage and thus boosting the level of employment (Barro and
Gordon, 1983; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). In as far as Europe enjoys wage
indexation, this source of time inconsistency is less relevant. The second
occurs when the demand for money depends negatively on the expected inflation
rate, because then the central bank has an incentive to renege and levy asurprise inflation tax and use the seigniorage to cut distoctionary taxes and
boost welfare (Calvo, 1978; Barro, 1983; van der Plceg, 1988b; Cukierman,
1989). The third occurs when treasuries issue nominal rather than real or
indexed government bonds, because then there is in principle an incentive to
impose a surprise inflation tax, wipe out the real value of government debt,
and have more funds available to cut distortionary taxes (Gros, 1988) and
increase the level of exhaustive public spending. In all three cases the rules
outcome leads, in equilibrium, to lower inflation than the diacretionary
outcome, hence all three cases can be used to illustrate the advantages of an
independent ESCB. To illustrate the argument, however, attention will be
focussed on the monetary discipline an independent ESCB may offer in safe-
guarding the real value of public debt, probably the most important source of
time inconsistency for Europe39.
Hence, assume that the treasuries issue, instead of real (or indexed)
bonds, nominal bonds with a guaranteed nominal rate of return, r. pe where pe
denotes the expected rate of inflation. The expected or ex-ante real interest
rate, or just the real interest rate for short, is according to this Fisherian
relationship determined by consumption tastes and production technologies,
more or less independent of the expected inflation rate, pe. If you compare
two states of the world with identical tastes and technologies, any difference
in nominal interest rates must then be due to differences in expected
inflation rates. The realised or ex-post real interest rate, r. pe - p, ís
relevant for borrowing and lending activities. It decreases with unanticipated
inflation, which is one way in which governments can reduce the level of their
inflation-corrected deficit, (r 4 pe - p)di ' gi - ti - pm, and reduce their
debt-GDP ratio over time4o. The problem of time inconsistency arises, because
unanticipated inflation can be used to wipe out the real value of public debt.
Two outcomes should be considered: rules and discretion. The point about the
trade-off between an optimal government revenue mix on the one hand and
discipline and low inflation on the other hand can be made both for the EMS
and the EMU.
3.1 The role of the Bundesbank in the EMS
For simplicity, consider first the EMS and the role of the Bundesbank.
Assume that the government minimises the same welfare loss function as in
section 1. The rules outcome is appropriate when the government has aufficient
discipline not to renege. The government can then credibly influence
expectations of the private sector so that in the determínation of its optimal
policy it can assume that pe - p. The rules outcome (denoted by a superscript28
R) is observationally equivalent to a situation where the government issues
real or indexed bonds. Of course, the rules outcome must be enforced or else
the government has an incentive to cheat with an unanticipated increase in
monetary growth and a corresponding reduction in distortionary taxes and
increase in the level of exhaustive public spending. The discretionary outcome
(denoted by a superscript D) is appropriate when the government cannot make
credible announcements and consequently must take ~ as given in the
determination of its optimal policies. The first optimality relationship of
section 1 changes to p~ -[bl(mtd)tD t b4p~]~(b2~b4), so that for a given tax
rate, exhaustive public spending is as before but inflation is now higher than
under the rules outcome, at least when the government has issued nominal debt.
The reason is that a lower monetary growth would not be credible, because then
the government is tempted to levy a surprise inflation tax. Upon substitution
into the government's intertemporal budget constraint, one has
tD - tR~{1 4 bl[m .(bZtb4)~(b3m)]d} less than tR.
It follows immediately that g~ exceeds gR and it is straightforward to show
that pD exceeds pR. Hence, a lack of monetary discipline, especially for
countries with a high level of public debt, leads to lower tax rates, higher
inflation rates and higher levels of exhaustive public spending then would be
the case when central banks do enjoy a reputation for sticking to rules. One
can argue that this is a reason why countries of southern Europe with a
dependent central bank, a lack of monetary discipline and high levels of
public debt extract relatively more revenues from seigniorage than from direct
taxation. Mother reason is that the costs of tax collection and the size of
the black economy are greater or that the tax system of those countries is
less efficient (higher value of bl), so that it is optimal to have higher
inflation and lower tax rates, even when the central banks of these countries
have a reputation for not succombing to pressures of inflationary finance.
The main reason for the central banks of southern Europe to join the EMS
may be that they gain the credibility of the Bundesbank and the associated
tying of their hands (proxied by b4) leading to lower inflation (essociated
with the term in b2) which they would miss otherwise. They have to judge
whether this advantage outweighs the less efficient public revenue mix they
m~y be stuck with under the EMS (associated with the terms in bl and b3). The
choice is to have either an independent monetary policy and no reputation
(b~-0) or to peg one's inflation rate to the German rate and obtain the
credibility of the Bundesbank (by tends to infinity). Hence, to have an29
incentive to join the EMS, the welfare (as measured by the terms 1n bl, b2 and
b3 only, thus excluding the intermediate target by} under a rulea outcome with
fixed exchange rates and no independent monetary policy (very high value of
bq, denoted by the superscript E) should be higher than under the
discretionery ou[come with an independent monetary policy and floating
exchange rates (bq-0, denoted by the superscript F). Since pE is less than pF
but tE exceeds tF and gE is less than gF, one has to trade off the merits of
lower inflation against the costs of higher tax rates and lower levela of
exhaustive public spending. One can show that, for the case of gp a gp, it
pays to join the EMS when (b2-blm2)d exceeda (b2~blm2)m, irreapective of the
value of b3. Hence, countries with a very high priority for low inflatlon
(high value of b2), with a low priority for eliminating tex diatortiona (low
value of bl) and with a large outstanding atock of nominal government debt
(high value of d) have a strong incentive to levy an unanticipated inflation
tax and thus will want to join the EMS in order to bind their hends to the
Bundesbank. For these countries, the gains in monetary discipline outweigh the
losses from more tax distortions. Italy, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands
have high levels of public debt and, especially the latter two countries, have
no clear wish to reduce tax distortions: no wonder that they are such fervent
supporters of the EMS! Britain is very keen on reducing tax distortions and
has less of a public debt problem, which may be a reason why it is less keen
to join the EMS.
Recent developments in Eastern Europe may well be relevant for the
development of the EMS as a zone of monetary discipline. The reunification of
the two Germanies creates additional demand for West-German products from
East-Germen citizens to consume what they previously could not end from firms
to build a new infrastructure for East-Germany. Thia is why many fear a bout
of inflation in West-Cermany during the process of integrating the two
economies. This mey well threaten the role of the Bundesbank in the short run
as a nominal anchor for the EMS, since inflation in the whole of Europe may
then rise. If this occurs, it is less likely that countries want to join or
stay in the EMS for then they have to give up an independent monetary
stabilisation policy (see part II) without necessarily obtaining a lower
inflation rate, even though their public revenue mix may become more
efficient4l
3.2 The role oP an independent ESCB in the EMU
There seems to be a serious political problem in moving from the EMS to
the EMU. In order for the British, French end Italians to benefit from the30
enhanced monetary discipline offered by the Bundesbank, they need to leave it
largely untouched as an autonomous institution. Indeed, the ESCB advocated by
the Delors Committee ís meant to be independent and based on the Bundesbank
model. However, from a political point of view the independence and sutonomy
of such sn ESCB may be threatened, because in lieu of the loss of an
independent monetary policy the electorates of these countries are likely to
want a strong element of control in the FSCB. But this s like letting the
baby go out with the bath water, because it would destroy the discipline
advantages associated with creating the new institution in the first place.
Despite the danger of these political problems, it seems worthwhile to compare
the non-cooperative and the cooperative discretionary outcomes for the EMU,
when it works with a dependent ESCB (denoted by the superscripts ND and CD,
respectively) on the one hand, with the rules óutcomes for the EMU when it
works with an independent ESCB on the other hand (denoted by the superscript
I, as discussed in section 2).
It is straightforward to show that (cf., section 2) pND ,
(rd~gp)~[m~b~(mNtd)] exceeds pCD -(rdtgp)~[m.b~(mtd)], which of course
exceeds pI - 0. The presence of an outstanding nominal public debt is an open
invitation to wipe it out with an unanticipated inflation tax and a dependent
FSCB cannot be trusted not to take up the invitation, hence inflation rates
under the discretionary outcomes exceed the rates under the rules outcome (pND
exceeds pNR ~d pCD exceeds pCR). It then follows that tiD is less than t~D,
which in turn is less than ti. Also, giD exceeds giD, which in turn exceeds
gi. Hence, as far as the treasuries are concerned, the presence of a dependent
ESCB and competition within the EMU improves welfare, since this reduces tax
distortions and raises the level of exhaustive public spending (as measured by
the terms in bl and b3), but as far as the central bankers are concerned this
reduces welfare, since it increases inflation (as measured by the term in b2).
This is in a nut-shell the conflict between ministers of finance and central
bankers. In a sense, the case of an independent ESCB corresponds to non-
cooperation between central banks and ministers of finance whílst the case of
a dependent ESCB means that the monetary and fiscal authorities in any
particular country are one and the same entity and can thus be assumed to
cooperate. It is easy to show that one is more likely to come out strongly in
favour of an independent ESCB when the level of average public debt (d) in
Europe is high, when the priority one attaches to price stability (b2) is
high, and when the priority one attaches to eliminating tax distortions (bl)
is low. Since the Delors Committee consisted largely of central bankers, it is
not surprising that they have come out in favour of an independent ESCB for31
the EMU.
In fact, the condítions under which one favours an independent ESCB over
a cooperative EMU with a dependent ESCB (CD) are exactly the same conditions
under which a country wants to join the EMS and peg its currency to the
Deutschemark (see section 3.1). More relevant, is perhapa that one prefers an
independent ESCB over a non-cooperative EMU with a dependent ESCH (ND) when
(b2 - blmZ)d exceeds [b2(2-N) t b1NmZ]m.
As the number of inembers of the EMU increases, thia condition becomes more
likely to hold (be violated), provided that b2 exceeds (is less than) blmz. In
other words, when the priority one attaches to price stability exceeds the
priority one attaches to reducing tax distortions and the number of EMU
countries is large, one always favours an independent ESCB over a non-
cooperative EMU with a dependent ESCB, and vice versa.
When one, nevertheless, comes out in favour of a dependent ESCB, one
should realise that macroeconomic policy coordination within the EMU m~y well
be counterproductive when one restricts attention to discretionary outcomes
(see part IV.1). This is likely to occur when the advantages of cooperation in
the form of lower inflation are outweighed by the disadvantages in the form of
more tax distortions and lower levels of exhaustive public spending (cf., van
der Ploeg, 1988b). Such a counter-example to the usefulness of macroeconomic
policy coordination is easily coastructed: when d--m, the CD-outcome yields
the same welfare as the I-outcome and, when (b2~b1)(N-3) C m2(N-1), the ND-
outcome yields a higher welfare than the I-outcome and thus the CD-outcome42.
Mscroeconomic policy coordination destroys discipline and can thus be
counterproductive!
4. Fiscal externalities under the EMU
Now consider the EMU, more or less as envisaged by the Delors Committee,
and ask what scope remains for the coordination of budgetary policies in
Europe. To be quite clear, individual treasuríes must finance their deficits
by borrowing and cannot benefit from seigniorage revenues (except from those
accruing through real growth), the ESCH is independent and pursues a stable
price level, all bonds are assumed to be perfect substitutes, capital markets
are fully liberalised, and the goods markets of Europe are fully integrated
with each other but not with the rest of the world. In addition, assume that
Europe as a whole is a small open economy relative to the rest of the world.
Three externalities are briefly consídered: spending by índividual tresauries32
is a public good to Europe as a whole, international tax competition, and an
externality arising from the common determination of the real exchange rate
and current account of Europe.
4.1 National public spending is a public good under the EMU
In view of the planned completion of the internal market for Europe, it
seems reasonable to assume that countries care more r: more about each
others' levels of public spending on the environment, training of low-skilled
workers, research and development, foreign aid (e.g., to Eastern Europe),
infrastructure, museums, etcetera. Although each member country of the EMU
benefits from a higher level of public goods provided by other countries of
the EMU, they do not have to pay the price in the form of higher taxes for it.
Absence of the coordination of budgetary policies means that exhaustive public
spending is not recognised as a public good for Europe as a whole and
consequently its supply will be inadequate. The theory of clubs may serve as a
useful guide in deciding on whether a sub-group of countries get together and
specialise in the production of certain public goods.
A special case needs to be made for publíc investment, because this is in
view of the developments in Eastern Europe, the bad state of the environment
and the demand for infrastructure very much needed in Europe. There are two
aspects of public investment that should be stressed: its international and
its intertemporal nature. It is clear that, due to the fact that most of
public investment is a public good for Europe as a whole, its supply will be
deficient. Just as important, however, is the fact that public investment with
a market rate of return increases the current level of exhaustive public
spending, but leaves the permanent level of exhaustive public spending
unaffected. The optimal response from the point of view of the theory of
public finance is to leave tax rates alone, but borrow and increase the public
sector deficit now in order to finance the investment outlays and to reap the
benefits later on. Unfortunately, the Delors Committee recommends guidelines
on public sector deficits without making a reference to public investment or
to permanent levels of public spending. Such a myopic view on the public
sector's finances is bound to harm public investment in Europe and should be
avoided at all costs. Much better is to advocate the "golden rule" of public
finance: tax for permanent increases in exhaustive public spending, but borrow
for temporary increases in current exhaustive public spending and for
(temporary of permanent) increases in public investment with a market rate of
return.33
4.2 International tax competition and tax harmonisation
If factors of production, goods and capital are highly mobile within
Europe, it is clear that individual treasuries do not want their tax rates to
diverge too much from their competitors for otherwise they would loae all
their revenues to their competitors43. Indeed convergence is a major
objective, but it is not clear what one should converge to (the lowest, the
highest of the average tax rate?) and whether one converges to Pareto-
efficient levels of tax rates or not. In fact, one must take account of the
possibility that each member country of the EMU attempts to be a tax haven and
have slightly lower tax rates than i ts competitora. In any case, treasuries
will not want to diverge too much, because otherwise the mobile part of their
labour force will prefer to migrate to the reat of the EMU and their consumers
will prefer to buy their products from the rest of the EMU. One of the main
concerns of Dutch macroeconomic policy is to bring marginal income tax rates
and VAT rates down to the European average or, more specifically, German
level. Such actions should be taken account of as well. If one takes account
of these effects, international competition will drive down tax rates and
levels of public spending in Europe below the levels that would prevail under
European coordination of budgetary policies. The downward bias in tax rates
arises from futile, beggar-thy-neighbour attempts to cut tax rates and
increases when the number of EMU-countries increases. In general, when an
individual treasury is faced with EMU-competitors who have a much lower need
for revenues (due to lower permanent levels of exhaustive public spending), it
is forced to cut tax rates snd exhaustive public spending, and to allow
private consumption to flourish, even though it is faced with a large need for
public revenues. If EMU-countries have similar preferences, tax smoothing does
not only occur over time, but also between EMU-competitors, even though their
levels of public debt and desired exhauative public apending differ. The main
point is that the outcome under tax competition is likely to be inefficient,
since all EMU-countries would be better off if they raised tax rates and
levels of exhaustive public spending44
Various studies on tax competition and on tax harmonisation are now
becamlug iiviillablc. (lni~ of the maln findings í B Lhat the lmmobilo factors of
production (usually the poorer workers) are going to be the losers of
uncoordinated tax competition and most heavily, since the mobile factors of
production (such as capital) will find their way to tax havens and thus have a
high price-elasticity and impose a high excess burden relative to the amount
of revenues collected (Sinn, 1989). To a certain extent, consumers will gain
as competition forces down VAT rates. Another set of results is that the34
residence principle leads to an inefficient world allocation of saving and
that the source principle leads to an inefficient world allocation of
investment. In addition, it can be shown somewhat surprisingly that ir: a
market-clearing world with perfect capital mobility (and the interest rate
determined on the world market) the residence principle is optimal and there
are no gains from tax coordination (Razin and Sadka, 1989b; c)45. In addition,
one could argue that tax distortions and evasion can be t ided through, say,
basing taxes on naticnality rather than on residence, but (given only too
common attempts to evade taxes) by far the best method seems to go for a
coordinated approach to tax harmonisation (Sinn, 1989). which is what the
Delors Committee seems to have 3n mind. Given the liberalisation and
integration of markets for capital, goods and services, there is more scope
for individual European countries to impose adverse externalities on others
and thus there is a need for coordination of capital income taxation within
Europe, starting with agreeing on a tax base and followed by setting minimum
statutory rates (Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990).
4.3 Europe's current account is a public good
Since the EMU is not a closed economy but an open economy relative to the
rest of the world, one can think of a number of externalities to do with the
fact that all EMU-countries share a common real exchange rate and current
account vis-à-vis the rest of the world (cf., Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989).
Budgetary policies of the various treasuries now jointly determine Europe's
real exchange rate and current account. A budgetary expansion by any of the
treasuries of the EMU raises the demand for European goods relative to those
from the rest of the world and thus induces an appreciation of Europe's real
exchange rate and a deficit on Europe's current account. Absence of the
coordination of budgetary policies in Europe means that Europe's real exchange
rate and current account are not recognised as public goods and leads to
inefficient outcomes when budgetary policies under the EMU are pursued in a
competitive fashion.
Treasuries must satisfy their usual intertemporal budget constraints, but
individual EMU-countries do not satisfy such as intertemporal constraint vis-
À-vis the outsíde world directly. Instead, the EMU-countries face a foint
intertemporal budget constraint vis-à-vis the countries outside the EMU. More
precisely, when the EMU as a whole is solvent, the present value of the stream
of the EMU's balance-of-trade surplusses must equal the outstanding net
foreign debt of the EMU as a whole. The EMU's balance of trade is jointly
determined, since it corresponds to the output produced by the whole of the35
EMU minus private and public consumption of the whole of tF.e EMU. A budgetary
expansion by any of the EMU-countries raises public or private consumption and
thus induces a deficit on Europe's current account. The associated
appreciation of Europe's real exchange rate reduces the cost of goods imported
from the rest of the world and thus reduces the cost of living and boosts real
income for all EMU-citizens.
When each treas~.~ry attempts to use budgetary policy to appreciate the
real exchange rate of' Europe and thus raise the real income of its citizens,
it increases its tax rate and its level of public consumption. In the absence
of European coordination of budgetary policies, the real exchange rate of
Europe is under-valued whilst exhaustive public spending and tax rates are too
low relative to the cooperative outcome. The reason is that spending by
treasuries reduces the cost of living for ell EMU-citizens and is thus a
public good. In effect, each EMU-country is trying to pass the burden of
appreciating the real value of Europe's currency on to its EMU-competitors
(van der Ploeg, 199ob).
The EMU as a whole might have an explicit target value for its current
account, perhaps, a deficit because Europe wants capital from outside Europe
to poor into Europe in order to rebuild Eastern-Europe. If this is the ceae,
mich ol' l,hu I{MIl-c~,unt.rlca w(II try to shift the burden of looeening the fiecal
stance to its EMU-competitors. The result is that public spending as a whole
will be too low throughout Europe and capital inflows into Europe will not be
high enough, relative to the outcome where all EMU-countries coordinate their
budgetary policies.
So far, this part has assumed that guidelines for national public sector
deficits are unnecessary and, perhaps, even undesirable. However, the
externalities in this section suggest that it may be worthwhile to impose a
requirement on the overall b~rrowing requirement for Europe. The point is
that, if EMU-countries only consider their own current account end not the
current account of Europe, then such limits on borrowing from outside the
European Community may act as a substitute for European coordination of
budgetary policies. Hence, it may be desirable to allow individusl governments
to borrow what they want from European households and institutions, but to
constrain or to encourage them in theír borrowing from outside the European
Community.36
IV. Counterproductivity of macroeconomic policy coordination
Most of the discussion so far gives the impression that international
coordination of macroeconomic policies is always a good thing, given the
particular exchange-rate regime in force. However, there are a vari~ety of
situations under which international coordination worser the welfare of the
countries concerned. This section discusses three good reasons why
international policy coordination may be counterproductive: (i) it worsens the
discipline of central banks and thus leads to higher inflation; (ii) it may
provoke an adverse response from third countries (such as the US); (iii) it
can make the countries concerned worse off when there is uncertainty or
disagreement about how the global economy functions. Since the move towards
the EMU closely resembles international policy coordination under a FLOAT,
these are in principle also three good reasons why the move towards the EMU
may be undesirable.
1. Coordination destroys discipline: Rules versus discretion
The view that international policy coordination is never a bad thing is
fallacious, because it can worsen the credibility problems of the central
banks vis-à-vis private sector agents and can therefore be counterproductive.
This paradox easily arises within the context of a Keynesian multi-country
world with rational expectations in financial markets and nominal wage
rigidity (Rogoff, 1985)46. Central banks have an incentive to renege on
previously announced plans by engaging in an unanticipated monetary expansion,
because this leads to higher prices, erodes the real values of the wage and
thus boosts employment and output. International policy coordination under a
FLOAT destroys the discipline of central banks and thus leads, in equilibrium,
to higher inflation and lower welfare for all countries concerned. The reason
is that, in the absence of cooperation, the depreciation of the exchange rate
and associated inflation costs provide a disincentive to renege which does not
arise under a cooperative FLOAT. Another way of looking at the paradox is that
coalition among a sub-set of players, the various central banks, can worsen
the game with the remaining players, private sector agents.
This paradox does not only arise in a world plagued by wide-spread
unemployment, but also occurs in a long-run world with full employment and all
markets clearing (van der Ploeg, 1988b)4~. The time inconsistency now has a
public-finance rationale48, because individual governments may levy a surprise
inflation tax and use the seigniorage revenues to cut distortionary taxes and37
increase spending on public goods, both of which increase wslfare. An increase
in taxes or public spending worsens foreign welfare49. In the absence of
cooperation this externality is not internalised, so distortionary taxes will
be too hígh and employment and private consumption will be too low whilst
public spending will be too high. However, with international policy
cooperation a discipline device is destroyed (as the exchange rate is
unaffected by a surprise inflation tax) and thus inflation will be higher and
holdings of real money balances will be lower than under a non-cooperative
FLOAT. Hence, international policy coordination is counterproductive when the
adverse effects of excessive monetary growth on inflation arising from e
worsening of monetary discipline outweigh the beneficisl welfare effects of
less tax distortions and a more optimal provision of public goods. Another
example of the counterproductivity of macroeconomic policy coordination under
the EMU, based on using unanticipated inflation to wipe out the real value of
nominal government debt, was already discussed at length in part III.3.2.
The point of the above three examples is that, when one restricts
attention to the discretionary rather than to the rules outcome, international
policy coordination under a FLOAT can be counterproductive, because it worsens
credibility problems and thus íncreases the incentive to have en unanticipated
increase in inflation5G. However, it is important to realise that the EMS, and
to a much greater extent the move towards the EMU, also destroy the discipline
device that is prevalent under a non-cooperative FLOAT. Hence, the EMS and EMU
worsen credibility problems of central banks vis-À-vis trade unions and other
private sector agents and may therefore graduslly lead to higher inflation
rates throughout Europe. The move from a FLOAT, towards the EMS end eventuslly
towards the EMU is only desirable when central banks already have aufficient
credibility and discipline in order for the private sector to believe that
they will not succomb to the temptation to renege on announced policies. This
is a different way of saying that the Bundesbank and De Nederlandsche Bank
with their excellent reputation for low-inflation policies must keep a major
say in the operation of the EMU end the ESCB and that the ESCB should be
allowed to conduct an independent and autonomous policy.
Indeed, this is perhaps one of the main reasons why countries whose
central banks are less disciplined (such as France, Italy or Ireland) chose to
join the EMS. Membership of the EMS can provide such countries with a"nominal
atichor": by peqqing their currenciea to the Deutschemark (and giving up en
independent monetary policy) they buy the credibility of the Bundeabank and
obtain a lower inflation rate than they would otherwise obtain (Giavazzi and
Pagano, 1988; Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1987, 1989a: Collina, 1988; Melitz,38
1988a). However, it can be argued that the reduction in inflation achieved by
the EMS-countries is not more spectacular than the ones achieved by other
OECD-countries and that the sacrifice ratios of some EMS countries are notebly
worse than those of other OECD-countries (e.g., Dornbusch, 1989). The move
towards the EMU may dilute the reputation of the Bundesbank and thus worsen
credibility problems throughout Europe and increase inflation in Europe; if
this is the case, the move from the EMS towards t EMU may well be
undesirable from the point of view of the objective of inilation. The case of
Ireland, however, suggests that the dramatic drop in inflation is a mixed
blessing, because although it was successful as far as gaining credibility is
concerned (Kremers, 1989), it has also led to the problems of high public
debt, massive emigration and high unemployment (Dornbusch, 1989).
2. The EMU versus the rest oP the world5l
Consider the EMU versus the rest of Lhe world, say the United States.
There is one currency in the EMU, the ECU, whose value in terms of dollars
floats. There is a stable US and a stable European money supply, so attention
is focussed on the fiscal policy responses to a situation of stagflation
caused by a world-wide adverse supply shock. Under a global, non-cooperative
outcome, the US exploits the smaller size of the EMU-countries by having a
looser fiscal stance and thus appreciating the real value of the dollar vis-à-
vis the ECU and exporting inflation to the countries of the EMU. However, when
the countries of the EMU cooperate, they can be treated as a bloc of roughly
the same size as the US and the analysis is as under a FLOAT (see part II.2):
right-wing (left-wing) treasuries have a too loose (tight) budgetary stance
relatively to the global, cooperative outcome. When the US is faced with a
coordinated EMU, it can no longer employ the tactic of appreciating the real
value of the dollar so that Europe has higher inflation when its fiscal
policies are coordinated. However, the US now must have a tighter fiscal
stance and thus unemployment in both the US and Europe will be higher. It
follows that coordination of budgetary policies within the EMU can be
counterproductive, especially when governments care a lot about unemployment.
The above is again a standard proposition in game theory: a coalition
among e sub-group of players (countries of the EMU) can decrease the utilities
of these players, because it may provoke an adverse response from other
players (the US).
j. Disagreement on the workings of the global economy
Various economists, particularly policy advisors in supranational39
organisations such as the IMF, argue that many countríes are reluctant to
participate in international policy coordination, because either they are
uncertain on how the global economy functions and unsure about the nature of
the interdependencies between their economy and other economies or their view
on these matters differ from the view of their partners in the EMS or summit
meetings. For example, German officials have been known to argue that a
budgetary expansion i4 bad for German employment, which is at variance with
what most economists teach and have been taught and is probably at variance
with what officials of other cour.tries believe. Given that when you ask ten
macroeconomists to give an answer to a question they are likely to give ten
different answers, theorists must live in "cloud-cuckoo land" when they think
that macroeconomists, let alone policymakers, can agree on a common model. It
is therefore no surprise that government officials disagree and quibble about
the functioning of the global economy and thus a fortiori are likely to have
the wrong view. Such lack of knowledge and dísagreement on the functioning of
the world economy can easily render international policy coordination
counterproductive and make all countries concerned worse off (Ghosh, 1986;
Frankel, 1988). For example, using ten multi-country models (e.g., Bryant et
al., 1988) as representing the views of the US government and other
governments, or the true world economy, out of 1000 possible combinations
monetary coordination perceptibly improved US welfare in only 546 cases and
welfare of other industrialised countries in only 539 cases (Frankel and
Rockett, 1988). Tndeed, many have argued that this is the main barrier to
succesful international policy coordination. A less known result is that, when
countries have the wrong view on the nature of global interdependence and do
not cooperate, they can be much better off than when they have the correct
view on the nature of global interdependence and do cooperate. Hence, better
information need not make countries better off when countries do not cooperate
because this can worsen various forma of conflicts arising from international
externalities (van der Ploeg, 1989d).
Conclusions
The main benefits of the EMU are well known and not directly related to
the issues of macroeconomic policy coordination: (i) elimination of exchange-
rate uncertainty and the costs of hedging against such risks; ( 11) more
economic use of international reserves for Europe as a whole; (iii)
availability of a more efficient unit of account, medium of exchange and store40
of value, and the ECU is likely to become a"vehicle currency"; (iv) saving on
transaction and information costs; (v) less speculative flows of capital; (vi)
political ambitions of an integrated Europe are achieved; (vii) more power in
G-j summit meetings, particularly in matters of monetary policy52. The main
costs are the loss of an independent monetary policy, possibly a weakening of
monetary discipline, and a sub-optimal government revenue mix in the sense of
too low (high) inflation rates and too high (low) t rates for those
countries with high (low) costs of tax collection. Since most of the benefits
show non-rivalry in consumption and are "public goods" whilst the
disadvantages are more like "private goods", the calculus of participation
suggests that Europe may not move far enough in the direction of the EMU and
small countries are likely to be "free riders" in the efforts to move towards
the EMU (Hamada, 1985, Chapter 3) . Hence, the impetus of the EMU must come
from the larger countries of the European Community.
Most of this report was, however, concerned with the potential need of
macroeconomic policy coordination during the various phases of economic and
monetary integration in Europe. Taking the problems of stabilisation policy in
the face of European-wide stagFlation caused by a common adverse supply shock
under alternative exchange-rate regime first, one finds that the EMU performs
better than the EMS or a regime of floating exchange rates. The reason is that
the futile competitive attempts to appreciate the currency and export
inflation and the associated beggar-thy-neighbour tightening of monetary
policy are altogether impossible within the EMU. EMS-followers manage to
disinflate away an adverse supply shock by appreciating their currency vis-à-
vis the Deutschemark at the expense of welfare in Germany, but would not be
able to do this under the EMU. In fact, this is one of the few reasons why
Germany may be keen to move to the EMU. As far as budgetary policy responses
to European-wide stagflation are concerned, German hegemony in monetary policy
under the EMS implies that Germany has a tighter fiscal stance than the other
EMS-countries and thus Germany is unlikely to fulfill its role as locomotive
"engine of growth for Europe". Both the EMS and the EMU are likely, especially
as intra-European trade increases, to have a built-in deflationary bias in
stabilisation policies, unless budgetary policies are coordinated. When real
wage rigidity and other forms of indexation are important phenomena, the
particular exchange-rate regime in force is irrelevant for real outcomes and
absence of international policy coordination is likely to lead to too tight
budgetary policies as well.
However, when Europe is hit by country-specific shocks or shocks
associated with switches in preferences, the EMU scores very badly on41
stabilisation policy. The reason is, of courae, that the cuirency cannot under
the EMU appreciate in response to the excess demand. The EMU is therefore only
likely to respond well to country-specific or switch shocks when either labour
markets clear instantaneously (as in such a fanciful world stabilisation
policy is not needed) , or labour mobility throughout Europe ia high. To the
extent that this is not likely, a atrong case can be made for a European
Federal Transfer Scheae which transfers income from regiona with unemployment
to regions with overemployment and which should thus be budget-neutral on the
Community level. Clearly, there are incentive problema with such a tranafer
scheme but they are reasonably well resolved on a national level end there ia
no reason to believe why they cannot be resolved at a European level. Only
giving benefits when the unemployed have the duty to take a job if offered,
even if it is not in their field of training, and training programmes would
help. If the people of Europe are not willing to introduce a EF15, individual
countries have a duty to pay much more attention to structural supply-side
policies in order to ensure that natíonal labour markets adjust more quickly
to full employment.
Moving on to the public-finance aspects of moving from the EMS to the
EMU, it is clear that a monetary union without an independent central bank
leads, in the absence of coordination of the policies of the various fiscal
and monetary authorities, to excessive inflation, too low tax rates and too
high levels of public spending. The reason is that each treasury fails to
internalise the adverse effects of grabbing more seigniorage from the common
central bank on the inflation rate that is common to all countries of the
union. When central bankers and ministers of finance can be relied upon not to
succomb to the temptation to levy surprise inflation taxes, there is not much
of a case For an independent ESCB. However, if one really wants to be aure
that the monetary authorities are not going to give in to the demanda of
unions for higher wages or of ministers of finence for financing their
deficits arising from high levels of public spending, the best atrategy aeema
to appoint conservative central bankers to the board of the ESCB and to make
sure that the status of the ESCB is sutonomous and independent of political
pressures. The price one pays for institutionalising monetary discipline ia a
sub-optimal public revenue mix, that is inflation and thus aeigniorage
revenues are too low whilst tax rates are too high and the level of exhaustive
public spending too low. Even though the inflation tax might disappear, some
seigniorage revenues will accrue through real growth and it will be a major
political issue to decide how those will be distributed to the members of the
EMU.42
It is clear that the Delors Committee has come out strongly in favour of
an independent ESCB based on the Cerman model, but it is also clear that this
implies a threat for the size of the public sector. Developments in Eastarn
Europe may lead to excess demand for German goods an~i an increase in German
inflation and thus in European inflation. Together with the dilution of the
German monetary discipline, caused by the appointment of less disciplined
central bankers to the Council cf the ESCB, this carries ie seeds of a less
successful EMU from the inflation point of view.
There are at least three fiscal externalities which also pose a danger to
the size of the public sector in Europe, unless of course budgetary policiea
of the various treasuries are coordinated. The first is that, as Europe
becomes more and more integrated, spending by national treasuries on items
such as the environment, training, research and development, foreign aid
(e.g., to Eastern Europe), and infrastructure, becomes more and more like a
public good to all citizens of Europe, whose supply will be inadequate unless
the treasuries coordinate their policies. The second is that international
competition between the treasuries of Europe drives tax rates down and leaves
less room for exhaustive public spending. The third is that treasuries may
wish to loosen their fiscal stance in order to appreciate the real exchange
rate of Europe and boost the real income of their citizens. Since such a
policy also has beneficisl effects on the rest of the EMU-countries, public
spending will be too low unless cooperation takes place. There does not seem
to be a firm public-finance case for imposing upper limits on public sector
deficits, as the Delors Committee recommends, but in view of this last
externality it may be sensible to impose limits on borrowing by treasuries
from outside the European Community for otherwise there may be insufficient
control over the value of Europe's currency in international markets.
One can think of three reasons why macroeconomic policy coordination
within Europe can be counterproductive. Firstly, it may provoke an adverse
response from the US leading to higher unemployment in Europe. Secondly, it
may destroy the use of the exchange rate as a discipline device for central
banks. Thirdly, conflicting views on how the global economy functions may
render macroeconomic policy coordination counterproductive. The first can be
countered by encouraging macroeconomic policy coordination between Europe and
the US, which seems more likely as an integrated Europe is likely to become a
more powerful negotiator in the G3-summits. The second can be countered by
ensuring that the ESCB has an independent and sutonomous status and that the
sole task of the ESCB is to preserve price stability. The third can be
countered by more discussions involving politicians, economists and the43
public. Given that all three points agaínst macroeconomic ;~olicy coordination
can be countered, it should be no surprise that this report concludes with a
strong plea for the coordination of budgetary policies in Europe in order to
ensure that stabilisation policy ia used effective].y to fight wide-spread
unemployment and, more generally, to safe-guard the size of the public sector
in Europe.
One can legitimately wonder whether the current size of the public sector
in Europe is too large relative to the first-best outcome. Indeed, many people
belíeve this is the case so that Europe is now in a second-best or third best
situation. Introducing distortions in a aecond-best world may be deairable, if
this cancels the effect of other distortíons. However, the experience of the
US suggests that the EMU may well pose a threat to the size of the public
sector. In the long run, when the EMU is firmly established, Europe may have
to get used to the problem of coping with e too small size of the public
sector. In the medium run, the competitive setting of budgetary policies under
the EMU may speed up the process of cutting the size of the public sector end
taking Europe in the direction of the fírst-best optimum. People who believe
that the current size of the public sector in Europe is too large should like
this.44
Notes
1. For useful overviews of the functioning of the EMS, see Gros and Thygesen
(1988), Giavazzi, Micossi and Miller (1988), and Giavazzi and Giovannini
(1989a).
2. Other reasons put forward in favour of a crawling peg are concern about the
future cohesiveness of EMS currencies when international trade in financial
assets is fully liberalised and when there is the danger ~hat the dollar may
have to fall by a further 20-30 per cent before global i ilances in current
accounts are eliminated. See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986, and Melitz (1988b)
for related discussions.
3. A balanced overview of the arguments for and against a breaking down of the
EMS as a consequence of fending off speculative attacks being less easy when
capital markets are liberalised may be found in Driffill (1988).
4. De Grauwe (1989a) casts some doubt on whether the EMS can be characterised
by German hegemony. However, de Grauwe (1989a) also finds that Italy (and
France) managed with the aid of capital controls to almost completely insulate
their domestic interest rates from speculative attacks.
5. Gro9 and Lane (1989) suggest that tightening of EMS-bands leads to more
intervention by all members, even if the formal responsibility for keeping
exchange rates within the bands lies with the peripheral countries. Hence,
progress on the proposals of the Delors Committee in itself leads to a
weakening of German hegemony.
6. For the countries of southern Europe seígniorage appears to have been an
important component of their financing policies, whereas for countries such as
the Netherlands seigniorage is a negligible source of revenues (Giavazzi,
1989; Grilli, 1988). This lack of consensus may well be a source of conflict
in the move towards fixed exchange rates and thus provide a case for a
national money (e.g., Fischer, 1982).
7. Goodhart (1989) claims that the Delors Report used the word "coordination"
at least 41 times and the word "convergence" at least 12 times; in addition,
many synonyms (e.g., cooperation, concertation) were used.
8. Such a non-cooperative outcome corresponds to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium
outcome, which in the presence of international externalities is usually not
Pareto-efficient for the countries concerned. Roubini (1987a; b) also
considers Stackelberg outcomes, which may be relevant in a discussion of
German leadership in the EMS.
9. In the language of game theory the rules outcome corresponds to a pre-
commitment outcome, whilst the discretionary outcome corresponds to subgame-
perfect outcome.
10. This section draws on van der Ploeg (1989c; 1990c).
11. Strictly speaking, perfect capital mobility does not only require absence
of capital controls but also perfect substitution between home and foreign
bonds. Although it seems realistic to assume full liberalisation of European
capital markets, it is worthwhile to point out that there are cases in which
capital market integration is only welfare-improving if governments coordinate
their monetary policies (Chang, 1989). The point is that financial integration45
enhances the impact of domestic policies on foreign intc~reat rates, real
allocations and welfare and thus liberalisation of capital markets increases
the welfare losses Fcom non-cooperative policymaking.
12. Hamada (1976) assumes purchasing power parity and uses the monetary
approach to the balance of payments to show that under fixed exchange rates
national monetary policies are highly interdependent and there are atrong
incentives to coordinate. The reason is that there ia a common ínflation rete,
given by the weighted growth in the aupply of domestic credit expansion plua
growth in internationnl reserves minus average growth in real income, and a
balance-of-payments ;~plus occurs when the demand for money exceeda the
domestic supply of money. Hence, an expanaion of domestic credit leads to a
def'icit, mirrored by surpluses elsewhere, and a higher inflation rate for all
member states. When welïare depends on inflation and the balance of payments,
Hemada (1976) shows that, in the absence of international policy coordinatíon,
inflation is higher than desired inflation when the increase in international
reserves exceeds the weighted desires increase in reservea. The reason is that
countries defend themselves against reserve accumulation by expanding domestic
credit and thus raising inflatíon. A FLOAT dces not require this type of
coordination, because balances of payments are always in equilibrium and each
central bank can set its own monetary growth to its desired inflation rate.
13. An increase in home monetary growth increases home inflation by the same
amount but leaves foreign inflation unaffected. It reduces real interest rates
and capital accumulation throughout the world. This can be called the
interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect. In the absence of international policy
cooperation each country fails to internalise the beneficial effects of higher
inflation on capital accumulation in the rest of the world end thus pursues a
too low monetary growth rate. Effectively, each country attempta to ahift the
burden of reducing the world real interest rate to its competitors.
14. Muasu (lyy0) statea that "The bohavior of Real Exchange Ratee is
SYSTEMATICALLY and SUBSTANTIALLY influenced by the nature of the Nominal
Exchange Rate Regime". The point ia that in the move from Bretton Wooda to
floating exchange rates, the volatility of nominal exchange rates and of real
exchange rates go up together. Similarly, in moving to the EMS, the volatility
of both real and nominal intra-European exchange rates diminished
considerably. The main implication of this solíd empirical fact is that it ía
reasonable to assume, at least in the short run, that nominal wages and prices
are much less volatile than nominal exchange ratea in a regime of floating
exchange rates. It thus seems, as a first shot, a sensible approximation to
assume fixed real exchange rates under the EMU and volatile real exchange
rates under a FLOAT.
15. When countries inherit a high inflation rate and engage in a monetary
disinflation, one usually finds that this occurs too fast as central banks
attempt to tighten their monetary policy and dump a higher cost of living on
their rivals (e.g., Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Miller and Salmon, 1985).
16. For s related analysis of dynamic monetary policy games under the EMS, see
Begg and Wyplosz (1987) and Huizinga (1989).
17. Any complications arising from speculative attacks are ignored, which may
be a bit tricky as capital controls will be abolished from lat July 1990
onwards.46
18. Basevi and Giavazzi ( 198~) use numerical simulation to show that, when the
EMU consists of countries with different structures, it is not optimal to have
fixed intra-European exchange rates, e~.en Nt~en countries are hit by identical
shocks.
19. The recent developments in the two Germanies provide, of course, a
spectacular example of labour mobility, whích means that from the point of
view of optimum currency areas the unification of West-Germany and East-
Germany is a splendid idea. It is essential for the EMU t~ be a success that
labour mobility within Europe is high, which may be fa y probable at the
margin in some sectors. Although Molle and van Mourik ~1988) provide some
empirical evidence, more work on this issue is badly needed.
20. However, as always one may doubt whether convoluted political horse-
trading leads to an equitable distribution. The some worries apply to the
harmonisation of rules for social security.
21. T71e intention to double the funds for regional and structural policies
does, of course, not deal with these problems.
22. When there are temporary and Europe-wide shocks, one could argue that the
budget of the EFTS should be balanced in an intertemporal fashion and that
this thus permits transfers from one generation to another in order to off-set
such temporary shocks. However, one could argue that there should be limits to
this use of the EFTS and, in general, to the transfer of additional fiscal
powers to the federal level, since benefits vary too much throughout Europe
and since the Community should not levy taxes as long as it is not fully
accountable to the electorates of Europe (also Goodhart, 1989).
23. The challenge is thus to supplement redistributive transfer schemes, such
as a EFTS, with incentive rules in order to make sure that the EFTS does not
take away the incentive for individual countries to adjust to market signals.
One way of having such incentive rules is to build in conditionality into the
EFTS. For example, training and schooling. Alternatively, one could have loans
to depressed regions with conditional elements such as interest rebates, the
rebate serving as the transfer. An alternative is, perhaps, to use changes in
VAT rates to bring about the required changes in wages and prices, but the
problem with such a scheme is that it runs counter to the attempts to
harmonise VAT rates in Europe.
24. This is exactly the opposite of what happens under a shift of preferences
from home to foreign goods, because then the depreciation of the currency that
occurs under a float softens the adverse effects on unemployment but leads to
a further fall in real income.
25. Of course, some would argue that the real issue is not whether shocks are
country-specific or not but whether shocks are sectoral or not. One could
envisage a Community-wide adverse shock to the steel industry. The most
appropriate response is then not necessarily macroeconomic stabilisation
policy, but a coordinated Community attempt at resolving the problems in the
steel industry.
26. This section draws on van der Ploeg (1989b).
27. Of course, even though right-wing governments end up with too loose and
left-wing governments with too tight fiscal stances, right-wing governments
will in general have tighter fiscal stances than left-wing governments.47
28. However, if a German fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy,
the German fiscal stance may be too loose.
29. Drèze et al. (1987), Drèze and Wyplosz (1988) and Wyplosz (1990) also
argue thst Europe with its wide-spread unemployment problem is in view of its
domestic problems in dire need of a coordinated budgetary expension, but that
Europe has not much incentive to reduce global imbalances for the sake of the
US. In either case, too little demand expansion ia undertaken in Europe to get
a good grip at its problem of wide-spread unemployment.
30. The point is the- Germany currently has no real individual incentive to
engage in a demand expansion, whereas many other parts of Europe would benefit
from a German expansion. In any case, microeconomic end supply side problems
are much more important in Germany because these stifle Germany's growth of
output, investment and employment, and reduce the responsiveness of the C~erman
economy to market signals (e.g., Lipschitz, et al., 1989)-
31. Of course, one could argue that the ESCB should adjust its monetary policy
in the face of European-wide shocks but this may go at the expense of its
reputation for strict monetary discipline (see Part III.3). This is the reason
why one may advocate an independent (and thus passive) ESCB.
32. This part draws on van der Ploeg (1990b) and attempts to give some reasons
why the EMU may pose a threat to the size of the public sector in Europe.
33. The menu costs of anticipated inflation can ususlly be measured in tecros
of triangles under the money demand schedule. However, empirically the
magnitude of such costs are small and in any case under the quantity theory
these costs are zero. However, if a higher level of anticipated inflation
leads to a higher variance of unanticipated inflation, resources will be
misallocated, arbitrary redistribution would occur and, perhaps, less long-
term contracts will be made. The resulting costs of inflation may be
substantial.
34. Empirical evidence may be found in de Jong and van der Ploeg (1990).
35. In any case, some argue on empirical grounds that the EMS has not really
got such a fantastic inflation-unemployment trade-off (e.g., as measured by
sacrifice ratios) anyway (Dornbusch, 1989). The reason ma,y be that EMS-
countries employed a gradualist disinflation policy whilst some of their
competitors (the UK and the US) employed a ahock treatment to get rid of
inflation (de Grauwe, 1989b). However, others argue that there ia evidence
that the EMS has enabled countries such as Ireland to reduce the output costs
of disinflation (Kremers, 1989).
36. In fact, the monetary union may end up at the wrong side of the
seigniorage Laffer curve, when money demand depends negatively on expected
inflation (Aizenman, 1989)-
37. In fact, the Delors Committee recommends a federal structure in which the
central banks of the EMU-countries are incorporated in a ESCB. The ESCB should
have an autonomous and independent atatus. The ESCB should have three levels
of organisation: (i) the Council of the ESCB consisting of the presidents of
the national central banks, which is independent of the Community and national
authorities (cf., the German "Zentralbankrat"); (íi) the Board of the ESCB,
which monitors monetary developments and oversees the implementation of the
common monetary policy (cf., the German "Direktorium"); and (íii) the national
central banks which execute the decisions taken by the Council (cf., the48
"Landeszentralbanken") ( also, see Eijffinger, 1989). Much more details on the
ECB can be found in De Cecco and Giovannini (1989)-
38. of course, the first-best response is to destroy such incentives to renege
on nominal contracts through, for example, wage indexation or the issue of
indexed rather than nominal bonds. Conversely, an ii-dependent FSCB does not
destroy all forms of capital levy.
39. There is plenty of evidence that wages in Europe are fairly well indexed
to consumers' prices (e.g., Brenson and Rotemberg, 198C so that the scope
for eroding the real value of the wage through unanti ,pated inflation is
limited. In any case, it is straightforward to extend the arguments of thís
part to also allow for an effect of unanticipated inflation on output as in
Barro and Gordon (1983). Since money is mainly held for transactions rather
than for speculative purposes, there is not much scope for eroding the real
value of money balances either. In any case, public debt in Europe is much
larger than the stock of real money balances.
40. Since the real stock of public debt, di, is no longer a predetermined
variable, an increase in the level rather than in the growth of the nominal
supply of high-powered money leads to an equal increase in the price level and
can thus be used to wipe out the real value of public debt at "the stroke of a
pen" (cf., Keynes, 1971, Chapter 2). Such capital levies are not discussed
here.
41. Of course one could question why an exchange-rate target is more credible
than a direct money-supply target. Presumably, the answer is that the EMS
provides an institutional arrangement for forcing countries to stick to their
exchange-rate commitments.
42. Sufficient conditions are d--m and N-2 or N-3 or (b2~b1) is less than m2,
so that, when the higher costs of tax collection dominate the gains arising
from lower inflation, cooperation is cotinterproductive. The counter-example is
based on a restructuring of government debt in such a way as to remove the
incentive to levy a surprise inflation in the cooperative outcome: the gains
on real money balances are exactly off-set by the losses on public assets.
43. In fact, this statement is only true when lower taxes are not capitalised.
If one country has lower taxes, then house prices may go up by exactly the
same amount as the annuity value of the tax advantage.
44. The point may be weakened somewhat if one allows countries to compete in
the provision of public goods ( e.g., an efficient legal system).
45. Other examples of the international coordination of tax policies in two-
country general equilibrium models with a well-developed supply side can be
found in Frenkel and Razin (1987; 1989), Frenkel, Razin and Symanski (1989).
and Razin and Sadka (1989a). An example of the Pareto-improving effects of
harmonisation of VAT rates can be found in Keen (1989).
46. One way to overcome the problem of time inconsistency is often thought to
be to appoint conservatie central bankers. In a two-country world this is
particularly true for asymmetric shocks, but symmetric shocks weaken the case
for conservative central bankers (Laskar, 1989).
47. Here attention is focussed on a monetary market-clearing model; Kehoe
(1987; 1989) considers the counterproductivity of coordinatíon of fiscal
policies within the context of a real market-clearing model with capital49
accumulation.
48. The time inconsistency arises despite the fact that public and private
preferences coincide. A related source of time inconsistency is when there ía
a conflict between a treasury and a central bank trying not to succomb to
pressure from ministers and other politicians to finance public spending with
seigniorage (see part III.2).
49. ~rhis policy change leads to a trade surplus, which is choked off by an
appreciation of the r~al exchange rate. Hence, foreign consumption of home
goods falls and forei~.. welfare falls.
50. However, it is important to realise that there exist counter-examples to
the point that international policy coordination can be counterproductive.
51. Details can be found ín van der Ploeg (1989b).
52. Original contributions to the theory of optimum currency areas are Mundell
(1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) which respectively emphasise the
criteria of factor mobility, openness, and diversification and fiscal
integration. Surveys of the pros and cons of common currency areas are given
by Ishyama (19~5) and by van der Plceg (1989a) and others in WRR (1989)-50
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